University of South Florida

Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Graduate School

March 2021

Struggling Against the Odds: Social Movements in Pakistan
During Authoritarian Regimes
Sajjad Hussain
University of South Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the International Relations Commons

Scholar Commons Citation
Hussain, Sajjad, "Struggling Against the Odds: Social Movements in Pakistan During Authoritarian
Regimes" (2021). Graduate Theses and Dissertations.
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/8795

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar
Commons. For more information, please contact scholarcommons@usf.edu.

Struggling Against the Odds: Social Movements in Pakistan During Authoritarian Regimes

by

Sajjad Hussain

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Government
School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies
College of Arts and Science
University of South Florida

Co-Major Professor Bernd Reiter, Ph.D.
Co-Major Professor Peter Funke, Ph.D.
Rachel May, Ph.D. Earl
Conteh-Morgan

Date of Approval:
March 31, 2021

Keywords: Contentious Politics, Democracy, South Asia, Civil Society
Copyright © 2021, Sajjad Hussain

Acknowledgements:
Alhamdulillah.
With an immeasurable sense of gratitude, I want to acknowledge the support of so many people
who motivated and inspired me to complete my dissertation. They made this journey rewarding.
I’d first like to thank my advisor, Professor Bernd Reiter whose mentorship has been an
influential source in shaping my research work. His scholarly encouragement and support
throughout these years have been invaluable. Thank you. I am also grateful to Dr. Peter Funke
for his invariably helpful feedback. His comments made my work better. My thanks go to Dr.
Rachel May as well. Not only was she generous with her feedback, but she was also an
inspirational teacher. My gratitude to Professor Conteh-Morgan for helping me sharpen my
arguments with his feedback. The manuscript has benefited from it. I would also like to add that
I have learnt so, so much from all of you. Your dedication as teachers adds to my appreciation
and love of teaching.
My circle of friends: You made this whole experience wonderful. Thank you.
Last but not least, my family. My late father: my baba. I miss him so much. Blessed be his soul.
My mother. My siblings. In whatever I have accomplished in life, it is them who have made it
possible and meaningful. Being away from them for so long has not been easy. It can never be.

I miss them. Their grace, generosity and love fill me with awe, and keep me anchored. Long
may all of them live, blissfully. Ameen.

Table of Contents

List of Acronyms ........................................................................................................................... iii
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... v
Introduction: ................................................................................................................................... 1
Research Question:.............................................................................................................. 7
Scope of the Study and limitations: .................................................................................... 8
Design and Method: ............................................................................................................ 8
Chapter 1 Literature Review: Surveying the Social Movements Literature................................ 10
Introduction: ...................................................................................................................... 10
Contending with the Definition: How is Social Movement Conceptualized: ................... 11
Regimes and the Movements: ........................................................................................... 12
Social Movements and Pakistan: ...................................................................................... 18
Conclusion: ....................................................................................................................... 21
Chapter 2: A Decade of Struggle against the Military Dictatorship: Students Movement
of 1960s .................................................................................................................................. 23
Introduction: ...................................................................................................................... 23
Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: .................................................................................. 24
General Ayub and authoritarianism: Cooption and repression: ........................................ 27
Curbing of the Press: ......................................................................................................... 28
One Unit System and the Protests: .................................................................................... 29
Elections, Protest and War in 1965: .................................................................................. 33
Student Movement and its Success: .................................................................................. 36
Conclusion: ....................................................................................................................... 41
Chapter 3: Movement for Restoration of Democracy (1981-84) ................................................. 44
Introduction: ...................................................................................................................... 44

i

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: A sketch from 1967 to 1977: ........................................................... 45
Popularity and Opposition: ............................................................................................... 49
Martial Law and Movement for Restoration of Democracy: ............................................ 52
MRD and its second wave of protests—1983: .................................................................. 56
Conclusion: ....................................................................................................................... 60
Chapter 4: 2007 Lawyers Movement ........................................................................................... 62
Introduction: ...................................................................................................................... 62
Military Coup and Regime Consolidation: ....................................................................... 63
Judicial Activism:.............................................................................................................. 68
The Movement and the Regime’s Response: .................................................................... 72
State of Emergency, new elections and the continuation of Lawyers Movement: ........... 75
Political Assassination and Its Impact: ............................................................................. 78
New Elections, New Civilian Government and the Movement: ....................................... 79
Conclusion: ....................................................................................................................... 82
Findings and Future Research: ..................................................................................................... 86
Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 91

ii

List of Acronyms
ML Muslim League
CA
NAP

Constituent Assembly
National Awami Party

NWFP North-West Frontier Province
LFO Legal Framework Order
PPP Pakistan People’s Party
ZAB Zulfikar Ali Bhutto MP
MOP Member of Parliament
MNA Member of National Assembly
MPA Member of Provincial Assembly
BB Benazir Bhutto
PMLN Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
MRD Movement for Restoration of Democracy
PCO Provisional Constitutional Order
NAB National Accountability Bureau
ARD Alliance for Restoration of Democracy
CJ Chief Justice
SJC Supreme Judicial Council

iii

PML-Q Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e Azam

iv

Abstract

This dissertation extends scholarship on the role of social movements against authoritarian
regimes. It argues that movements turn into popular mobilizations and achieve successful
outcomes when they occur in the consolidated phases of authoritarian regimes. Using the political
opportunity structure framework, the dissertation maintains that a regime’s stability instils
confidence in it to substitute coercion with incentives wherein it allows limited but strictly
regulated freedoms for oppositional politics. This creates new openings for the challengers,
enabling mobilization with an increase in size and scope. Unlike the initial phase, when the regime
is consolidating and repressing collective action in a ruthless manner, the consolidated phase is a
period in which the movements make the most of opportunities available that lead to their success.
The dissertation explores it empirically by discussing three social movements against authoritarian
regimes in Pakistan that took place in different moments of the country’s history: Student
Movement, Movement for Restoration of Democracy, and Lawyers Movement.
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Introduction:

Pakistan has a long history of struggle against authoritarianism. The path to democracy has never
been smooth, illustrated by multiple military coups that interrupted democratic transitions. In the
face of impossible odds confronting democratic forces, it is social movements that best capture the
country’s political history. This dissertation, therefore, is concerned with the social movements
against the authoritarian regimes in Pakistan. It primarily focuses on three movements—Student
Movement, Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), and Lawyers Movement—that took
place in different moments of the country’s history. Specifically, the question the dissertation seeks
to explore is: What explains the success and failure of these movements against the authoritarian
regimes? I posit that the social movements turn into popular mobilizations with bigger success
when they occur in the consolidated phase of authoritarian regimes; thus, providing more political
opportunities for the collective action to succeed. I show how a regime’s stability instils confidence
in it to substitute coercion with incentives which shifts the opportunities for the challengers,
enabling mobilization with an increase in size and scope. Unlike the initial phase, when the regime
is consolidating and repressing collective action in a ruthless manner, I maintain, the consolidated
phase is a period in which the movements make the most of opportunities available that lead to
their success.
I use the political opportunity structure framework to explore the occurrence and the outcome of
the movements. The framework is useful in capturing the criticalness of the political structure in
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shaping the movements by facilitating or inhibiting collective action (C. T. Tarrow 2015, 238). It
also illustrates that the movements are not an organizational matter alone. Both opportunities and
threats prompt and influence the movement outcomes. Borrowing from Sidney Tarrow’s
definition, threat “relates to costs and risks of action or inaction”, and opportunities are the
movement’s perceived probability that its “protest actions will lead to success in achieving a
desired outcome” (Tarrow 2011, 160). I expand on this classification and will define the success
of a movement as the attainment of decisive political change as it mobilizes. The desired outcome
a movement seeks is never uncomplicated. Political structure provides a useful lens into the
determinants of the movement’s outcome, showing how a movement does not only look for the
expanded access to seize but also seeks to exploit the potential elite division, find influential allies,
and avoid repression for the outcome reflective of its success (Tarrow 2012, 78,79,80,81). These
factors, as I show below, profoundly influence the movement’s trajectory. If the success depends
on how a social movement responds to the opportunities and threats encompassing the
aforementioned factors, failure is not unavoidable. I view the failure of a social movement as its
inability to realize its primary goals it explicitly articulated at the mobilization outset resulting in
the movement’s demobilization. The demobilization can be swift, or gradual, with the authorities’
recourse to effective preemption and cooption. These characterizations of success and failure will
be elaborated, analytically empirically, in the movement cases that I examine in the following
sections. I do it by discussing how authoritarian regime’s consolidation has a determining effect
on a social movement’s fate.
I show how the authoritarian regimes deploy a combination of excessively repressive and coopting
tactics to weaken and quell collective action as the former consolidate. Such a repression and
cooption not only effectively enable regime consolidation wherein it crushes or absorbs opposition,
2

but also serves as a cautionary tale to the challengers for any future mobilization. Once
consolidated, regimes gradually allow some, albeit regulated, freedoms to gain public legitimacy
(Gerschewski 2013). Loosening restrictions also represents consolidated regimes’ confidence to
overcome any opposition. Likewise, it could also be their implicit understanding of the reality that
the repressive force alone cannot guarantee active compliance and obedience of a population;
particularly when it consists of ethnically and politically diverse groups with disparate
socioeconomic and sociopolitical interests. Combining repression with limited political openings,
unbanning political parties, holding elections, allowing electoral participation of the opposition et
al, are means to prolong the authoritarian rule (Gerschewski 2013, 16) along with an attempt to
gain legitimacy. The consolidated regime might not regard the small-scale protest instances as
destabilizing (DAVID A. SNOW, et al. 2019), rather as a tolerance for restricted opposition. It is
in this consolidated phase, then, that the movements mobilize—prompted by a host of factors,
including opportunities and threats. Depending on the phases of the consolidation, movements
realize their objectives, or demobilize due to increased repression and accompanying
organizational factors.
In the cases I analyze in the following chapters, it is demonstrated how one of Pakistan’s major
pro-democracy movements, MRD, was crushed brutally by General Zia in the regime’s
consolidating phase. Other regimes went after the challengers with no less unyielding and
uncompromising might as they engaged in the consolidating process. The banning of political
parties, student politics, long imprisonment of opposition leaders, judicial trials, crackdown on the
press, and other disruptive, even direct violence—to neutralize the opposition characterized the
regimes’ responses. In the consolidated phases, confident of effectively managing any adverse
outcomes, the regimes loosened restrictions to relative degrees that allowed some oppositional
3

politics. It was precisely in those moments, opportunities, that simultaneously served as an impetus
to the movements to act. Well-organized as the Student and Lawyers movements were, they were
able to mobilize as they won influential allies in civil society groups and political parties. The
eventual outcome to have their demands accepted, forcing the dictators to resign, illustrate the
success of these movements. Indeed, there have been fewer movements historically that have
achieved their goals in their original form (S. G. Tarrow 2011, 215). It is germane, though, to note
that movements will always have different outcomes in that they can be a success politically, but
might fail in cultural and social realms; or vice versa (M. Giugni 2013).
To explicate the main argument, I begin with surveying the literature on social movements and
authoritarianism. That survey constitutes the core of my literature review, appearing in chapter 2.
While it will engage with the conceptual and definitional aspects of literature on authoritarian
systems, it will also highlight the historical evolution of and the current conversation involving the
scholarship on social movements. The chapter, most importantly, underlines the constraints and
incentives typical of the political opportunity structures to show how even the new focus on social
movements in Pakistan does not sufficiently address this framework. The section then delves into
the body of work on the historical trajectory of social movements in Pakistan; and identifies the
gaps that this dissertation attempts to fill.
I then move to chapter 3 wherein I shed light on Pakistan’s initial history; particularly focusing on
the country’s struggle with democracy and dictatorship. Having provided an overview of that
political trajectory, I discuss the failures and eventual success of the movements against the Field
Marshal General Mohammad Ayub Khan (1958-69) who seized power through a bloodless
military coup in 1958. The chapter lays out how varying protests erupted against the military coup
in the initial years of his seizing power; and were relentlessly crushed. I also show that while the
4

ebbs and flows of the movements are important, how the regime employs coercive apparatus to
repel or crush protests also factors in determining the course of the movements. Similarly, I
illustrate that while the mass mobilizations were neutralized by the regime using various repressive
and coopting means, changing political factors opened newer opportunities for the opposition to
mobilize. Consolidated regime’s holding Presidential election in 1965 in a drive to deepen its hold
on power, became an opportunity for the otherwise weakened political parties to challenge the
dictatorial rule. Student Movement, building on its ideological strength and mobilizational
experience, came to forefront no less at the aftermath of the rigged elections. It is instructive then
that Student Movement led a strong, nonviolent campaign aimed at seeking the dictator’s
resignation that eventuated with success. In the success of this movement, the indispensability of
the new allies in political parties along with other accompanying structural factors cannot be
understated.
In Chapter 4, I discuss and explore the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (1981-1984). I
contextualize the movement with the rise and success of Pakistan People’s Party, and Prime
Ministerial candidate, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (Jalal 2014). He was executed in 1979 after a
controversial judicial trial after General Zia ul-Haq’s 1977 military coup. Having set forth the
historical context, one that also highlights the abrogation of new Constitution and dismantling of a
democratically elected leader after the country’s first general elections, I then analyze the political
developments that engendered the movement in 1981. Exploring the events and episodes
influencing the path of this unprecedented movement, I throw light on the conditions under which
MRD mobilized. The collective action was aimed at the lifting of martial law, reinstatement of the
1973 Constitution, and restoration of democracy by holding free and fair elections. However, the
regime responded with characteristic brutality and manipulation, blunting the movement at its
5

onset. The chapter details how General Zia ensured neutralization of the movement, particularly
with economic and political incentives to MRD’s opponents. By 1984, MRD had significantly
weakened, barely maintaining its momentum. The dictator’s 1984 referendum, extending his rule
for another five years, and the decision to hold 1985’s non-party elections which MRD boycotted,
further cornered the movement. The movement remained on the political horizon all but by name
until 1988 when General Zia died in an air-crash.
In chapter 5, which would be the culmination of this dissertation, I delve into 2007-09 Pakistan
Lawyers’ Movement that arguably holds a central place in Pakistan’s political history. The
movement erupted after Pakistan’s Supreme Court Chief Justice (SCCJ), Iftikhar Muhammad
Chaudhry was removed by President General Pervez Musharraf, a military general who came to
power after a bloodless coup in 1999 (Raza 2007). The movement’s transition from its initial
demand to restore the Chief Justice to eventually also seek General Musharraf’s resignation
resemble the objectives of the previous two movements. I show in the discussion how the opening
avenues for contention in the forms of a more activist judiciary, an expanding and assertive civil
society and burgeoning media blunted the repressive tactics of the authoritarian regime in its latter
phase. I also illustrate how the regime in its incipient, consolidatory point used varying tactics to
placate, coerce and suppress opposition. But the tides turned for the opposition. My argument is
that the immutability of political environment allowed the movement leaders in the latter phase to
engage in collective action that resonated with, and won support from, several sections of the
society. I particularly draw attention to how civil society became part of the movement even though
its rise somewhat lay in Musharraf’s policies of economic liberalization.
The profoundly enduring role of these movements’ merits close attention. They emerged, evolved,
failed, or succeeded in arguably the most difficult times in Pakistan’s history. Of note are two
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junctures of the political development: Framing the Constitution right after the 1947 independence
and reframing another after the tragic disintegration of country in 1971. The Constitution took
almost a decade to be written and approved, but soon followed the first martial law in 1958 and
abrogation of the framework. In 1977, military dictator General Zia repealed the 1973 Constitution
that had been framed after the separation of country’s two wings. If there is a seemingly inescapable
authoritarian shadow on the country’s politics, there are also deep democratic aspirations. This
dissertation seeks to reflect on that struggle.
Also, there is no more apposite time to explore the movements than the moments of history we are
living in. What makes it an important research inquiry is the ongoing global pandemic and the rise
of authoritarian governments around the globe (Smith and Cheesman 2020). The elected leaders’
authoritarian tendencies are most dramatically manifesting themselves even in the traditionally
democratic societies, creating fear and backlash simultaneously. Hence, while civil liberties and
freedoms are growingly coming under strain, there are protests against them amid, or despite, the
deadly pandemic (Smith and Cheesman 2020). In this context, a historical evaluation of the
movements against the authoritarian regimes is useful. The analysis is valuable in that we can
explore the evolution and culmination of movements to understand the present, it is also helpful in
providing us the lens to understand the nature of regimes and their respective maneuvers.
Research Question:
What explains the success and failure of the social movements in Pakistan against the authoritarian
regimes? My hypothesis is that the movements turn into popular mobilizations when they occur in
the consolidated phase of authoritarian regimes, thus providing more political opportunities for
social movements to succeed.
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Scope of the Study and limitations:
The first unit of analysis are the unsuccessful movements against the military dictatorship of Field
Martial General Ayub Khan from 1958 to 1969 (Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan 2004). Secondly, it
delves into the emergence of the movement by the National Student Federation (NSF) that
successfully dislodged the military dictator, Ayub Khan in 1969 (Bajwa 2019). The third case it
analyzes is the Movement of Restoration of Democracy from 1981-84: An unsuccessful drive
against the military dictatorship of General Zia-ul Haq (S. Shafqat 2018). Lastly, it discusses and
delves into the Lawyers Movement of 2007 that succeeded against the consolidated military rule
of General Pervez Musharraf (Hashim 2013).
Design and Method:
It is a qualitative study with case study design to provide a meaningful explanation of the
movements against the authoritarian regimes. I am using document analysis method for this work.
I have relied on different data on the evolution of the movements. The data include books,
newspaper, biographies, magazine articles, peer-reviewed publications, theses and dissertations.
The coverage of events in the data as they unfolded, and then historically documented, will benefit
the document analysis. It also allows for a tracking of the developments that took place in the
earlier as well as the latter phases of the movements. Hence, I will be able to identify developments
and gradual changes shaping the movements’ trajectories. Likewise, the method offers an added
space for interpretation and analysis. There are some limitations too. For example, the problem of
insufficient detail that might have arisen owing to non-availability of documents, or their low
retrievability. An incomplete collection of data due to the technicalities involved might add to the
biased selectivity (Bowen 2009). However, this in no way minimizes the abovementioned benefits
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of the document analysis. With the literature and data used for the work, I hope to achieve a depth
of historical detail that this dissertation seeks to explore.
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Chapter 1 Literature Review: Surveying the Social Movements Literature

Introduction:
This chapter examines the literature on social movement, and authoritarianism. Beginning with the
historical evolution of the theoretical and empirical work on social movements, it bridges the work
with authoritarianism. The chapter highlights the conceptual and definitional complexities that
have been the characteristic of the work on authoritarian systems. The prime focus, though, will
be on the constraints and incentives typical of political opportunity structures. Its elaboration is
key to show how even the new focus on social movements in Pakistan does not sufficiently address
this framework. Also, the role of framing will be elucidated, highlighting how the governing elite
engages with its own framing to maintain internal cohesion especially when it is an authoritarian
regime. The chapter then transitions into movements in Pakistan; particularly the ones directed
against the authoritarian setups. It assesses the body of work on the historical trajectory of social
movements in Pakistan; and identifies the gaps that this dissertation attempts to fill. It is noteworthy
that the literature on Pakistani politics has been predominately state-centric, in that it deals
primarily with the state and its functions; nation-building, ideology; and because of the country’s
geostrategic importance, plentiful attention and description of foreign policy. Amid a largely,
historically understudied subject of movements in Pakistan, the discussion offered here will be an
important conceptual addition.
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Contending with the Definition: How is Social Movement Conceptualized:
The wave of democratization around the world, confronted by the lingering challenges to their
democratic solidification, has continually provided opportunities for, and posed challenges to, the
protest movements. From Chile to South Africa, and from the United States to Sudan, there is a
persistence of social movements that are aptly described as ‘the social movement society’ (David
S. Meyer 1998). More precisely, movements against authoritarian regimes have garnered plenty of
attention as these collective actions open space for struggles for making nonviolent political claims.
While the politics of it remains the central concern, the literature on the subject has substantially
expanded too. Citizen mobilization forms the core of the movements; for without their
participation, nonviolent movements would have scant chances of accomplishing their set
objectives. However, well-spread as the movements are globally, Sidney Tarrow remains loath to
call every event as an extension of ‘social movement’ until they meet certain criteria (Tarrow
2011). Contestation on what social movement is, therefore, merits discussion in order to capture
the essence of movements being focused in this work. Addressing the components of social
movements increases considering the number of movements in Pakistan, necessitating delving into
literature to understand the political phenomena. The basic properties of the movements, as Tarrow
breaks them down, are their capacity to mount collective challenges, the ability to draw on social
networks, having common purposes and cultural frameworks, and to build solidarity through
connective structures (Tarrow 2011, 8). What these properties help understand is the social
movements’ being rooted in societal processes. They deal simultaneously with the social processes
and contradictions. These facets lend the movements prominence, and the goals that they aspire to
achieve a distinction. In the societies where people do not have a regular access to institutors face
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numerous representative challenges. How do, then, regimes matter in the understanding of
movement’s presence and evolution?
Regimes and the Movements:
Definitional aspects of the terms should be illustrated to help expand the empirical data once we
dive into analyzing them. We would have to articulate who the regime, or for that matter,
government is. Regime, per Guillermo O’Donnell, is the “set of effectively prevailing patterns (not
necessarily legally formalized) that establish the modalities of recruitment and access to
government’, and the government being ‘the set of persons who occupy the top positions in the
state apparatus in accordance with the rules of a given regime, and who are formally entitled to
mobilize the resources controlled by state apparatus in support of their or prohibitions” (O'Donnell
1963, 6). For him, then, it is the government that will constitute the highest point of state apparatus,
and regime happens to be the “networks of routes that lead to it” (O'Donnell 1963). Combine it
with how Tarrow conceptualizes and analyzes the history of regimes—one that brings the high
capacity democratic regimes as a recent phenomenon and the high-capacity undemocratic ones as
an older reality (Castaneda and Schneider 2017)—we have an important study in this dissertation.
Also, equally important is the underlying element of people’s power to act in more organized states.
Likewise, it also reflects the systematic and calculated nature of collective action, unlike the
prevalent theoretical notions prior to the 1960s of the actors’ being ‘arational’, if not outright
irrational (Jenkins 1983). This study would be incomplete without taking a look at how the
discourse around the social movements evolved into becoming the framework as it stands today.
An overhaul, a reorientation, of the study of social movements came in the 1960s. One of the
fundamentally important developments in this regard was the utilitarian model to account for the
collective behavior participation (Olson 1965). Olson’s emphasis was on how collective behavior
12

ought to offer incentive—from salary, prestige to leadership role—in order for people to be
attracted to the participation. Such an incentive, as Olson posited, would provide individuals an
inducement to actively participate. While Olson was theorizing in a particular context, theorists
built up on his and his predecessors’ work—among others—to advance the resource mobilization
theory (McCarthy and Zald 1973) (McCarthy and Zald 1977).
Theorists attribute the proliferation of social movement literature and theoretical expansion to
substantial borrowing from OS (Davis, et al. 2005). Resource mobilization theory, hence, has
benefited heavily from the aforementioned field. The whole theory came at a tumultuous time in
the history of the United States. Building on the empirical evidence available to theorists, it aimed
to expand the descriptive parameters (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1214). For John D. McCarthy and
Mayer Zald, movements were necessarily structured and patterned. As stated above, this was a
departure from the collective behavior tradition. The resource mobilization theory provided a more
nuanced view, arguing that social movements could be seen as extending politics through other
means, and can have its analysis just like any other forms of political struggle (Buechler 1993).
This was a shift of sorts; focusing theoretical inquiry to the ‘how’ from the previous of ‘why’
question; highlighting how movements are organized. In their major paper, the two also differently
classified a social movement, social movement organization, and social movement industry
(McCarthy and Zald 1977).
The classifications were important in that they distinguished the three elements’ role in the
respective times. For starters, it was important to highlight that social movements were not always
mobilized, and that a social movement could be typically represented by more than one
organization; and that the social movement industry (SMI) would not necessarily be hinging upon
the size of a social movement and its intensity or preferences. All in all, their aim was to
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demonstrate the inclusiveness of the phenomena. John McCarthy and Mayer Zald elaborated on
how the social movements could simultaneously encompass narrow and broad preferences, ranging
from the evangelistic to millenarian (McCarthy and Zald 1977, 1219). What is of particular note
in their argument is their description of the basis for social movement organization: They posit that
social movements must have resources—however few they happen to be and whatever their type—
in order to set off their work. This point is critical as we delve into social movement, and the social
movement organization’s roles. Importantly, McCarthy and Zald see actions involving The
Citizens’ Board of Inquiry into Hunger and Malnutrition in the United States, the National Council
of Senior Citizens for Health Care through Social Security, Common Cause— coupled with the
consumer right campaign—as a form of resource mobilization (McCarthy and Zald 1977).
Many would challenge this. Doug McAdam, for example, was quick to draw a distinction between
a movement and what he saw as resemblance of interest lobbies (McAdam 1999). McAdam
offered his political process model to essentially draw a clear distinction between his classification
of what underpinned the social movements compared to the classical and resource mobilization
perspectives. For him, the political process was to convey two major ideas: That in contrast to the
classical perspectives, a social movement is fundamentally political; and it is a continuous process
(McAdam 1999, 36). This elaboration and emphasis on the movements’ being a continuation of
the process, and their being political constitute an important theoretical orientation largely because
it helps us in expanding on the framing. McAdam’s theory was meant to provide an analytical tool
to illustrate the entire process of the movement rather than a particular phase. Where his analysis
acquires greater relevance for the discussion in this work is how McAdam views the shift in the
structure of political opportunity. Such a shift was witnessed in the civil rights movement; in that
the repression intersected with contention. McAdam illustrates the strength of the more organized
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civil rights movement, arguing that opting or avoiding repression for the government was a
consequential decision (McAdam 1999, 56). Borrowing from the Marxist perspective, McAdam
does not discount the asymmetry in the capabilities of the state and the contention-making,
excluded groups. He maintains that the excluded groups have their power embedded in various
structures ranging from the political to economic (McAdam 1999, 37). For him, if an event, or—
more concretely—a broad social process that somehow undermines the calculations and
assumptions of the political establishment marks a shift in political opportunities (McAdam 1999).
Those changes could be of any nature. From the industrialization, as McAdam posits it, or a
realignment internationally, or continued unemployment domestically and potential demographic
changes. The discussion brings us to the political opportunity structure, best captured in the
classifications Tilly and Tarrow offer in their work.
For them, the features of a regime substantially bear on the outcome of threats and opportunities
that claimants make; and the resultant ‘changes in those features produce changes in the character
of contention’ (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 59). The features of the political structure are 1) the
multiplicity of independent centers of power within it, 2)its openness to new actors, 3) the
instability of current political alignments, 4) the availability of influential allies or supporters for
challengers, 5) the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective claim making, and
6) decisive changes in items 1 to 5 (Tilly and Tarrow 2015, 59). The volatile and stable political
opportunity structures are important for Tarrow (S. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social
Movements and Contentious Politics 1998). Theorists have come to problematize such
characterization—the stable and volatile with the latter being the opportunities that demonstrate
shifting of political alliances and alteration in the capacity for social control, and the former being
the opportunities that primarily show the strength of the institutions (Almi 2007).
15

In this characterization of the opportunity structure, especially when the authoritarian regimes are
ruling the roost, the response of elite to social movement actors merits scrutiny. For example, those
studying transitions to democracy argue that proliferation of popular mobilization—and the
pressure they apply—may actually spoil the chances for democracy (Anderson 1999). However,
that constitutes a reductionist argument in the sense that it somehow either underplays or overlooks
the power of those leading the movements. How the authorities respond to the expressions of
grievances will have a significant impact on the movement and democratization’s intersection.
Also, the multiplicity of power elite—and their varying interests—weakens the argument. Granted
that the collective actions can be exploited by different actors who can change their course into
something undesirable, the democracy-oriented movements are still a force in strengthening and
expanding the civil liberties. It is here that the framing lends itself for discussion. David Snow has
shown that frames equip the events and occurrence with meaning and memory; and can have a
powerful function to guide action and organize experiences (David A. Snow 1986). Frame, in other
words, provides an opportunity to the movement leaders to shape the narrative and counter the
repressive state tactics. Frames also help those leading the movement to think anew, or more
creatively about the issue at hand.
Literature on social movements and authoritarianism also deals with how the state officials engage
in meaning work to avoid elite divisions from forming in light of the popular challenges to regime
legitimacy (Bray, Shriver and Adams 2019). The authoritarian regimes have to sustain the political
order, hence even a minute challenge may be costly for the elite. However, the main emphasis in
the discussion on the elite framing lies on the horizontal and vertical differentiation of the elites
across the state organizations (Bray, Shriver and Adams 2019, 685), making the criticality of elite
cohesion on the issues prominent. In order to avert any kind of internal dichotomy, then, actors
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within the authoritarian setup would also direct attention to internal framing in order to influence
the elites’ conceptualization of protests (Grauvogel and Soest 2014).
Authoritarian regimes also deliberatively work for the legitimation of their rule—a route different
from coaxing and coercing. The new focus in the literature on this aspect informs the discussion
well in understanding how the non-democratic regimes perpetuate their reign. Unlike the
totalitarian regimes that had omnipresent political ideology that they ruthlessly instilled in people’s
minds and hearts, the evolving non-democratic regimes use other tactics for legitimation
(Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2017). Dukalskis & Gerschewski have shown how reimges also use
‘passivity mechanism’ in which the aim is to assert its unassaible power and cohesion, instiling a
sense of resignation in the opponennts and challengers (Dukalskis and Gerschewski 2017, 259).
‘Performance legitimation’ is another way that non-democratic setups employ to stretch their
rule—which is qualitatively different. In it the authoritarian rulers try to shed a limelight on their
supposedly strong economic performance and sell it to the population as comparatively better than
the predecessors. Likewise, holding semi-competitive, multiparty elections are an additional
mechanism to gain internal and external legitimacy. Elections held under authoritarian regimes are
also a means for the undemocratic leaders to not only identify opponents but also to recompense
allies with patronage (C. T. Tarrow 2015, 64). However, these elections could also serve as an
opportunity for the opposition to not only use them as moments to engage in activistic politics but
also to highlight the manipulation and corruption of the non-democratic setups. Examples abound
in this regard. Serbia and Georgia are two countries where the authoritarian rulers faced this
challenge by the opposition (C. T. Tarrow 2015). Reliance on these tools serve regimes differently;
but both constraints and opportunities are what the movements perceive and respond to too.
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The literature dealing with the non-democratic authoritarian regimes’ drive to claim and win
legitimacy opens an avenue to what the following section discusses: Social movements and
Pakistan.
Social Movements and Pakistan:
Literature on Pakistan’s history—as stated above—has mostly had a focus on the state-building
and nation-building, foreign policy, democratization et al (Jalal 2014) (Haqqani 2005) (Cohen
2004) (Pardesi 2012) (Ansari 2015). Not that the social movements in the country have not received
attention, but as I explain below, the 2007-2009 Lawyers Movement constitutes a catalyst in this
regard. Be that as it may, the civil-military relations, political and democratic instability,
constitutional breakdown and development have been dominant themes (Mahmud 1993) (Cheema
2002) (Jafferlot 2004) (S. Ahmed 2005). The examination of relationship between the institutions
in the country, the instability that has been rife, the wars with India have been studied and analyzed.
However, a thorough inquiry into the movements up until the 2007-2009 Lawyers Movement,
particularly through the use of social movements’ lens, is largely missing barring a few exceptions.
Malik Hammad Ahmad has attempted to cast another look another Movement for Restoration of
Democracy in his dissertation (Ahmad 2015); arguing that unlike the seeming consensus of the
scholars, the movement was not a failure. Some of the recent contributions relate to historical
inquiry into the women’s movement in the country (A. Khan 2018); especially the struggle by
women against General Zia Ul Haq’s repressive policies. Likewise, Mubashir A. Rizvi has carried
out an impressive research work to trace the land rights movement in Pakistan (M. Rizvi 2019).
These two works are more specific in their orientation, dealing with geographically contained
locale. For example, Rizvi’s work is primarily focused on the movement’s concentration in Punjab.
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Regardless, the discontents existent in the country, and the mobilization that has followed is now
more closely engaged and examined through the social movements’ lens.
That said, there has been a significant proliferation in the social movements literature after the
2007-2009 Lawyers’ Movement—some of which I have also used in this work. The success of
the Lawyers Movement sharpened the focus not only on the lawyers, but also on civil society,
political parties and media whose roles were prominent in putting an end to the General
Musharraf’s authoritarian regime. With the burgeoning of literature, though, there is still a room
for revisiting the struggles for restoration of democracy in Pakistan, especially the ones revolving
around confronting the authoritarian setups predating the one in 2007. It is largely because a
holistic look has not been cast at the movements that were crushed by the military dictators, or
the movements that succeeded in what was arguably the consolidated phase of the
aforementioned two authoritarian regimes. Consider even the contemporary literature delving
into the Lawyers Movement that seeks to examine the struggle for restoration of democracy.
Sahar Shafqat’s inquiry into the politicization of judiciary under authoritarian regimes—looking
into the Pakistani judiciary’s role and how the civil society’s mobilization impacted it—constitutes
an important work. Shafqat primarily focuses on 2007-2009 Lawyers Movement, surveying the
proactive role of Pakistani judiciary under General Musharraf’s rule; and how the judiciary under
the authoritarian regime evolved to be a force for the ushering of democracy. The excellent work,
though, does not extensively look into the judiciary’s role in the past where it almost always
endorsed and legitimized the military rule. While Shafqat’s paper deals with the prominent role
that civil society played against General’s regime, it could shed more light on, for example, civil
society might have mobilized during the previous two authoritarian regimes. Such an analysis
would provide a comparative look into the movements preceding the 2007-09 ones It is in this
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regard that not only can a comparative lens be had in inquiring the movements in my dissertation,
but it can also be an empirical contribution to the opportunity structure.
The civil resistance culminating in the ouster of General Musharraf is dealt with elsewhere too,
using multiple disciplinary lenses. However, the civil society’s role, or lack thereof in the previous
expressions of social movements. In Zahid Shahab Ahmad and Maria Stephan’s paper—delving
into the 2007-2009 lawyers’ movement—the focus is the civil society’s nonviolent and effective
participation; but they could cast a more critical look at the political parties in previous movements
could find allies in the civil society, and how would that shape the movement course (Ahmed and
Stephan 2009). Additionally, barring a passing reference, the elaboration of how constrains were
imposed by the regime, and if there were opportunities for the movement actors are not delineated
in detail. On the other hand, Marta Bolognani looks at the effects of media strategies during the
2007-2009 movement (Bolognani 2010). Not only are the frames specific in the aforementioned
cases, but it does not expand on the precedents and opportunities that enabled the Lawyers
Movements. How, for instance, might the system have been ripe for changes with new openings
for the actors as there was a dynamic conflict between the institutions for power; and how the
instability of political alignments played a role in dismantling the regime.
Likewise, to recap, while the successful outcome of the Lawyers Movement has been studied and
analyzed, the previous movements have not received as much analytical attention, barring a few
accounts. That is where it is important to expand on the discussion because while the literature has
provided some helpful accounts of respective issues, they still leave a lot of room for more analyses
(Hassan and Chawla 2019) (Mushtaq 2015). For example, the movements against the first two
military regimes—of General Ayub and General Zia—merit more focus. It is here that the
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dissertation demonstrates how different individuals engaged in political struggle in the initial years
of Pakistan’s history when General Ayub Khan seized power in 1958 through a military coup
(Cohen 2004) or the struggle against General Zia, or General Musharraf. The outcomes will then
be discussed. The aim is to weigh on them using the lens of political opportunity structure. From
the ethnic groups to the political parties and student unions, how the diverse groups converged to
mount a collective struggle Ayub, Zia and Musharraf regimes will be illustrated through the
political opportunity structure framework. Importantly, how the incentives and constraints
exhibited themselves through the political opportunity structures (Tilly 2017).
What the patterns of the actions were, and how the regime used the institutional apparatus—to
coerce and convince the opposition into submission will form the main bulk of the work. It will
also look into the effort to gain legitimacy, internally and externally, was an almost similar tactic
in all three military dictators’ ruling mechanism barring a few minor differences. If General Ayub
introduced the concept of Basic Democracy Councils’, General Pervez Musharraf tinkered with
devolution of power, bringing ‘Local Bodies System’, and General Zia brought held elections on
‘non-party’ basis. All of them primarily wanted the strong opposition divided and out, and systems
in hand that not only served deferentially but also efficiently. The efficiency was more to capitalize
on what it deemed public support and legitimacy. In other words, the variations in the movements,
the claim-making by the actors, the actions and their sequences amid opportunities and constraints
would be expounded.
Conclusion:
This chapter examined the trajectory of social movement literature, illustrating the conceptual
evolution of the movements. From the definitional aspects of the movement to the empirics of it,
the chapter engaged with the different disciplinary lenses. It also highlighted the work on the
21

debates relating to the authoritarian regimes, and the conceptual complexities. The chapter then
surveyed the literature on social movements on Pakistan; highlighting how the theoretical and
empirical prominence of the contentious politics is a newer phenomenon. Its newness is a sharp
contrast to how the literature has historically carried out scholarly work on Pakistan which is
primarily focused more on the state and its institutions, nation-building, foreign policy, ideology
and security. The chapter elaborated on how the current interest and work on the movement takes
different lenses to approach the 2007-2009 Lawyers Movement. The renewed focus on disparate
contemporary movements, be it feminism or land rights movements, was also briefly touched upon.
It was also emphasized that their focal point is indeed different; but they do provide an insight into
how there is an increased engagement using the social movement lens. As for the previous
movements—one preceding 2007-09 Lawyers Movement, how the ones that were crushed or those
that succeeded, this dissertation will have a more detailed look using political opportunity structure.
Hence, the dissertation seeks to fill that gap by delving into the checkered history of the country;
the struggle for democracy and the authoritarian regimes’ responses. In particular, how the
consolidated regimes turn out to be more vulnerable in the consolidated phases will be assessed.
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Chapter 2: A Decade of Struggle against the Military Dictatorship: Students Movement of
1960s

Introduction:
This chapter provides an overview of Pakistan’s initial history, and the country’s struggle with
democracy and dictatorship. It then explores the failures and eventual success of the movements
against the General Mohammad Ayub’s dictatorship. The chapter lays out how movements erupted
against Ayub’s extra-constitutional steps and highhandedness, particularly the expansive
centralization enacted through the One Unit Scheme. As much as the ebb and flows of the
movements are important, authorities’ coercive tool to repel or crush contention also factors in the
protests. It is these factors that are explained in the chapter, showing how the initial movements
were warded off or crushed as the regime responded to the mobilization in its consolidating phase.
The chapter also illustrates how the Student Movement adapted strategies with the available
political opportunities to force the dictator’s resignation in 1969. Notable point in the eventual
outcome of the movement is to see how 1965 Presidential Election sowed the seeds of change.
This event and a few other internal and external developments changed the political dynamics. It
is important to remember that while the mass mobilizations can be terminated by the regimes using
the state apparatus, changing structural factors present newer opportunities for the movements to
remobilize. The remobilization, hence, can bring about its own changes; something that the
Student Movement’s success represented.
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Constitutionalism and Dictatorship:
One of the prime challenges that the Pakistani polity has confronted since its inception in 1947 is
political instability. The death of country’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s, within a year created
a (Malik 1997). Centralized structures of governance disempowered and deprived the smaller
provinces. (S. Ahmed 2005). The stringent centralization trampled the aspiration and struggle for
constitutionalism and rule of law (S. J. Ahmed 2013). What also complicated the socioeconomic
and sociopolitical conditions was East Pakistan’s geographical distance from the Western wing,
being almost a 1000 miles apart (Cohen 2004). According to the 1951 census, Pakistan had a
population of 75 million—with West Pakistan consisting of 33.7 million, and 42 million living in
East Pakistan (Jaffrelot 2015, 110). East Pakistan was comprised predominantly of Bengali
population while the West Pakistan was comprised of Punjabi, Siraiki, Sindhi, Pashtun and Baloch
populations along with other smaller ethnic and linguistic groups. The majority Bengalis demanded
a federal system, and democracy (Jalal 2014). However, the governing elite did not share the same
view. This elite consisted mostly of unrepresentative civilian and military bureaucrats, wielded
power arbitrarily (S. Ahmed 2005). Its exercise of power—reflecting more of a unitary rather than
a federal conception of state—was bound to be fraught given the country’s sheer ethnic, linguistic
and regional diversities (Cohen 2004).
In just 11 years, by 1958, the country had already witnessed extralegal dismissal of four Heads of
the State and seven Prime Ministers (Dobell 1969). The struggle for constitutional order in the first
decade was the most challenging. Pakistan’s Constituent Assembly, adopted Objectives Resolution
in 1949 that, guaranteeing fundamental rights, also envisaged a federal system along with
independent judiciary (Mahmud 1993). The Assembly was tasked with framing and adopting the
new constitution. However, the Assembly itself was dissolved by a retired bureaucrat, Ghulam
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Mohammad, in 1954 (Mahmud 1993, 1233), throwing the country into political turmoil. Legal
battle followed in the court. The decision was first declared illegal by the Sindh High Court;
however, the dissolution was given a legal cover in a 3-2 Federal Court decision under the doctrine
of necessity (D. S. Ahmed 2017). This was a derailing of a hope to have civilian supremacy in the
country. With the prevailing uncertainty, the constitution was eventually framed and adopted in
1956 by the new Constituent Assembly (S. J. Ahmed 2013). A parliamentary system was the basis
of this constitution (Pardesi 2012); envisaging the country as a Federal Republic consisting of two
units: East Pakistan and West Pakistan (Kavalski and Zolkos 2008). The constitution set forth a
unicameral legislature that was supposedly based on the two wings’ representation in parity
(Kavalski and Zolkos 2008, 77). The whole framework was essentially a hybridity in that it was
an executive-parliamentary system wherein the provincial enactments were superseded by the
central legislation (Mahmud 1993, 1242).
And that power granted to the President would impact the country’s uneasy political transitions.
Central and provincial governments were dismissed by the President Iskander Mirza (Cohen
2004). Mirza had overseen the promulgation of the country’s first constitution. However, he also
became the one to witness its abrogation in 1958 (Cohen 2004). Among the reasons historians cite
for this martial law was the supposed general elections in February 1959 under the 1956
Constitution (Mahmud 1993, 1243). Mirza installed General Mohammad Ayub Khan as Supreme
Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan and Chief Martial Law Administrator (Cohen 2004).
His motivation, apparently, was to install a presidential form of democracy in the country by
introducing new constitution (D. S. Ahmed 2017). A merely three weeks into becoming the martial
law administrator, however, Ayub dismissed President Mirza. He cited Mirza’s abrogation of the
constitution as an act that rendered the latter without any legal authority (Gohar 1985).
25

By 1962, Ayub lifted martial law and promulgated the 1962 Constitution, extending and
entrenching the center’s power as well as becoming the President. (Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan
2004, 65). Under this Constitution, the President held the executive power; indirectly elected by
an electoral college that consisted 80,000 Basic Democrats (Mahmud 1993, 1252). Ayub justified
his action by contrasting the distinct nature of the polity he ruled whose need was different from
the western pattern of democracy (M. A. Khan 1965). Ironically, the central theme in historical
commentary concerning General Ayub’s presidency—along with his concept of ‘democracy’—
is related to the economic initiatives he undertook (Burki 1972) (Cohen 2004) (Dobell 1969). And
the ostensible success of economic policy seemed to resonate in the world capitals. So much so
that the then President of the World Bank, R. S. McNamara, termed the economic growth in
Pakistan amongst the most successful cases in the world (Dobell 1969, 297). Nevertheless, the
touted growth could not gloss over the massive income inequality whereby a few dozen
landholding and wealthy families had the concentration of political and economic powers in their
hands (Jalal 2014, 104).
Also, General Ayub engineered a different managing of the new constitutional setup, one which
massively relied on and promoted patronage (Dobell 1969). This translated into the coming
together of legislators in the assemblies that primarily were from the upper socioeconomic
hierarchy (Dobell 1969). The political and administrative empowerment of the economic elite,
under the expanding ‘philosophy of growth’ led to the subsidization of the export industry as well
as the creation of specialized banks (Maniruzzaman 1971). This concentration of wealth exhibited
itself in the ascension of big business houses; from the banks, to insurance companies and other
financial institutions.
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Capital then became concentrated in the hands of the small group of powerful elites at the expense
of the majority. This enormous inequality led to equally profound political instability—particularly
in East Pakistan that had already been bearing the brunt of economic disparity. This meant
sharpening of regional loyalties, leading to a seemingly unbridgeable disconnect between the
unpopular leadership and the masses. As stated above, the ruling elite offered patronage to the less
fortunate, but as their lack of care about the deepening economic and political grievances grew,
discontent simmered. General Ayub’s promoting the ideal of basic democracy could not be more
contradictory to his personal style of ruling of the authoritarian paternalism (Jafferlot 2004, 71).
While the disparities ignited resentment, agitation was gradually increasing (Jones and O'Donnel
2012). The regime used various methods to manage and repress the opposition.
General Ayub and authoritarianism: Cooption and repression:
There was a mixture of policies behind General Ayub’s need to neutralize any political threat to
his regime. He relied heavily on cooption and coercion (Jafferlot 2004). Importantly, he formed
his own ‘Muslim Conventional League’ (MCL) party (Burki, Ayub's Fall: A Socio-Economic
Explanation 1972). The formation of this new political entity was aimed at attracting veterans of
other parties—including the former Muslim League members to populate MCL. General Ayub
undertook this co-opting tactic when the opposition started forming political parties with the lifting
of martial law in 1962 (Jafferlot 2004, 72). For General Ayub, allowing any mobilization by the
opposition constituted a threat. Any potential of collective action through the political
mobilization, however small scale, was discouraged. These were years of solidification for the
regime—and having initially caused disruption in the domestic politics through banning political
parties, his setup wanted to ensure wooing influential political leaders. Allowing the parties to
form, and making one of his own, also illustrated the regime’s attempt to gain some legitimacy in
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the eyes of the public. Nevertheless, the prime aim was to not leave any space utilizable for the
opposition. As Charles Tilly points out, governments are always equipped with the ability to
repress or facilitate the contender’s mobilization (Tilly 2017). Regime institutions keep themselves
abreast with, and ready to respond to any, repertoires the opposition use. Ayub targeted other
sections of the polity that could become a challenge to the regime. The press was one of them.
Curbing of the Press:
General Ayub went after the press as determinedly as he did against those engaged in political
opposition (Gunaratne 1970). For the Ayub regime, a free press could pose a credible challenge
especially with the disparate oppositional interests and grievances across the country. Tarrow
points out that media’s capacity to frame the contention is immense, citing the example of
American New Left in 1960s whose communication was mostly disseminated through media (S.
Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics 2011, 32). With few
means of communication possible for the country’s clustered and disorganized opposition to have
some semblance of organization and possibility of mobilization, press could be a way of
articulating the opposition. Knowing this, the regime took multiple measures to avert any
mobilization that could be aided by the press; or any opposition launched by the press against the
regime. Security of Pakistan Ordinance of 1959, for example, was an enactment that gave power
to the regime to curb press—enabling it to even dissolve the board of directors of the news
publications. The Pakistan Times, Lailo-Nahar, and Imroze were some of the newspapers who bore
the brunt of the Ordinance (DAWN 1959).
Ayub also instituted what was called the ‘Pakistan Writers’ Guild’ that rewarded pro-regime
intellectuals as well coopting the regime’s malleable critics (Malik 1997, 135). The idea was to
influence the dissenting voices; and if such a step did not bear fruit, coercion would be used to
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curtail them. By 1964, the National Press Trust was established to effectively take control of
national newspapers (Niazi 2010). Advertisements in the newspapers were used as a tactic of
reward and punishment; forcing even the obstreperous journalists to engage in self-censorship
(Jalal 2014, 114). For a centralized state, this meant and greater control over the press. Be that as
it may, the measures taken by Ayub in the early years also demonstrate the authoritarian regime’s
unmistakable effort to curb press freedom and the right to free expression as it solidified its hold
on power. Tarrow rightly points out, in delineating the threats, the capacity of authorities to
discourage contention (Tarrow 2011, 110). It can be contended that there were lesser cleavages
and opportunities available to the opposition to launch an impactful campaign against the regime
amid such a fierce crackdown on the media; and also, the state’s capacity of repression squeezed
the press as a whole. It also demonstrated the regime’s unyielding march to consolidation,
One Unit System and the Protests:
As pointed above, One Unit merged the four provinces in West Pakistan—namely North-West
Frontier Province, Balochistan, Sindh, and Punjab. The imposition of One Unit preceded Ayub’s
power takeover in 1958. It was an administrative system promulgated in 1955 by Governor General
Ghulam Mohammad Khan—a bureaucrat from Punjab (Kennedy 1981). The system remained in
place until 1969, years after Genera Ayub’s 1958 military coup. The rationale provided for the One
Unit was apparently to frame the country’s Constitution after counterbalancing the size
differentials of both wings (Kennedy 1981, 942). But it was not only aimed at offsetting the
majority province, but also the smaller provincial entities. Hence, there was an intense opposition
by almost all the ethnic groups that regarded the scheme as an attempt to deny their rightful share
of economic and political power (Jalal 2014, 114). Hence, Bengali, Pashtun, Baloch and Sindhi—
the dominant ethnic groups in their respective provinces— parties individually and collectively
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opposed it. Some notable movements erupted after Ayub’s takeover in 1958 that are discussed in
this section. What this section demonstrates is that even the collective nature of the contention
initially by different groups did not lead to the accomplishment of key goals—from the reversal of
One Unit system to all other demands concerning the provincial autonomy.
Bengalis, who formed the majority ethnic group in Pakistan, remained fundamentally opposed to
One Unit. For them, this massive centralization would bring not only political costs, but also
economic deprivation (Jalal 2014). Hence the discontent was rife. The opposition to the One Unit
was expressed and manifested through Awami League—the party representing East Pakistan. It
was formed in 1949 as the East Pakistan Awami League whose demands were purely regional
(Rashiduzzaman 1970). Hence it was one of the foremost parties to start campaigning against One
Unit, remaining unreconciled with the very idea of administrative concentration. While Awami
League (AL) was seen as popular in East Pakistan, its organizational skills were not as robust in
its fledgling days (Rashiduzzaman 1970). Where it did succeed was to frame the provincial
autonomy as the key to the country’s national cohesion. Geographically in a thousand-mile
distance, AL’s alliance with the politically and ethnically diverse, not to mention fragmented
groups, was not easy. Also, Ayub regime—and even its predecessors—did not look upon such a
coalition favorably. Where AL’s politics resonated was its ability to spotlight the importance of
provincial autonomy. A framing of this sort is what Tarrow also sees as the one that forms a
struggle not only in the streets, but also a contest over meaning (S. G. Tarrow 2011, 32). The
mounting dissatisfaction, though, was repressed. And the opposition did not translate into a force
that the consolidating regime would not tolerate. Baloch, on the other hand, resisted the imposition
of One Unit with equal verve (Ali 2005). They already had grievances against the
underrepresentation in the local bureaucracy (Jaffrelot 2015, 137). Although the province is the
smallest in terms of its population, it represents over 40 percent of the country’s surface and is
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bordered by Iran and Afghanistan (Jaffrelot and Rais 1998). Baloch leaders viewed the One Unit
as a denial of political, economic and social accommodation within the political and economic
structures of the country. For the ethnic group that inhabited the largest territory in the country,
One Unit in a way was the beginning of a denial to be accepted as a sub-nationality within the
country (Sheikh 2018) as well as a denial of control over their resources. However, unlike the
opposition in other parts of the country, the struggle in Balochistan turned into an insurgent
violence. A Baloch tribal chief, Sardar Nauroz Khan, led a violent insurrection. The insurgency
continued for a year before it was crushed by the government forces (Ali 2005, 46). Those who
were a part of this uprising were arrested and executed; and Nauroz Khan himself died in the prison.
At the same time, as the regime consolidated itself, the 1962 elections were an opportunity for
some Baloch leaders to not only contest elections but also form alliances with mainstream parties.
The success came in the form of some nationalist leaders joining National Awami Party (NAP).
NAP’s foundation was laid in 1957 and it brought together some of the staunchest nationalist—
Bengali, Sindhi, Pashtun, and Baloch, leaders together (Paracha 2014). The alliance was aimed at
forming the majority coalition in the first elections to be held based on universal adult franchise
(Paracha 2014). However, the 1958 coup prevented that possibility. That impacted the Baloch
political forces significantly. On the other hand, when the 1962 Presidential elections were held,
based on the newly introduced basic democracies, with political parties banned, prominent
leaders like Khair Bux Marri, and Ataullah Mengal participated individually and won elections.
Their critical speeches against the deprivation of Baloch brought a swift reaction by the regime;
their tribal Sardari titles and privileges were removed, and Mengal was imprisoned (Ali 2005,
46). The political leaderships’ imprisonment and accompanying action to neutralize any political
opposition illustrated the regime’s hold on power. It also meant that the grievances that the
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political leaders channeled through their speeches be obstructed and that the provincial
leadership’s demand be kept unaddressed (A. Khan 2009).
One Unit caused resentment among other provinces too. Sindh also underwent agitational politics
against the massive centralization. Among the grievances that the nationalists and intellectual
circles expressed in this province were the rightful share of Sindh over the resource distribution.
Language was a source of contention, and the nationalists viewed the dominance of Urdu as the
dilution of Sindhi language. Urdu was made the country’s national language even though the native
speakers were among the smallest groups after the independence (Rehman 1995). For Sindhis,
language served as a marker of identity; and its elevation in the province was deemed critical.
However, barring the episodic protests which were either crushed or disallowed, a noticeable
mobilization was not registered in Sindh. Despite repression, to assert the political and cultural
distinctness, the nationalists celebrated November 9, 1962 as the Sindh Day. The main demand the
somewhat unorganized groups pressed was the restoration of Sindhi language’s status (Rehman
1995, 1010). That demand remained unaccepted because Ayub feared the similar call from other
ethnic groups. However, the fact that it had some news spotlight in a centralized setting was
momentous in that it served as a reminder that the identity issue was complicated and unresolved.
Amid the repression that characterized the response to the language agitation in Sindh, the Ayub
regime remained both unyielding. Too centralized a regime was unwilling to accommodate the
ethnic movements’ demands (Jaffrelot and Rais 1998).
It has been argued in the dissertation that movements initiated in the formative phase of
authoritarian regime find it difficult to maintain and sustain itself because the regime treats the
contentious action as a threat. The movements, mentioned here, failed because Ayub’s government
came down hard on them. (Maniruzzaman 1971, 282). The sub-nationalistic feeling swept parts
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of Pakistan and occasionally translated into protest eruptions. If one were to evaluate the historical
evidence available about the aforementioned mobilizations, one would find that the opposition—
divided on ethnic or regional lines—lacked the means to mobilize. For example, while there was a
collective interest to mobilize for the end of One-Unit system, forming a joint opposition for the
ethnic and regional groups did not seem possible. Alberto Melucci’s musings on this aspect is of
particular relevance. For him, the unity of a social movement—in that the movement brings
together and accommodates the polarities—is key (Melucci 2009). However, Melucci reflects on
the historical aspect of the movements, especially in the societies where the process of unification
and centralization impacted the trajectory of movements (Melucci 2009, 36). When such a
divergence existed, an authoritarian state would have more tools available to alter the fate of
movements. Although the One Unit affected the smaller provinces equally, divided and
unorganized contention did not translate into successful movements. In the sections below, a more
organized mobilization would gradually create more conditions for the movements. Also, there
were varying degrees of their vulnerability that could not be overlooked.
Elections, Protest and War in 1965:
With the emboldening of his regime, and the concomitant confidence, Ayub decided to hold an
indirect presidential election in 1965 (Gohar 1985). Monopolizing and manipulating the elections
in an authoritarian regime is inevitable. As is pointed out by Juan J. Linz, authoritarian regimes do
not accept honest competition between political forces (Linz 2000). In this case, Ayub’s own
political survival was on line in case a strong candidate challenged his Presidential reelection
despite his paradoxical self-confidence. To his surprise, a number of active political leaders came
together to form Combined Opposition Parties (Jalal 2014, 115), to compete in the election. This
was an opposition consisting parties from both the wings and representing major sections of the
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society. Ideologically, both the left and right parties were parts of it. Sensing a threat to his
authority, Ayub started making his own moves. Empirical evidences in other historical instances
of authoritarian manipulation of elections are aplenty. Incumbents predictably engage in more
manipulation and repression (Marquez 2017) under politically existential circumstances. From
banning and imprisoning the opposition members, gaging and censoring media, and rigging,
incumbent authoritarians do not eschew using non-electoral means to retain power to retain power
(Marquez 2017, 02). Those were the exact measures that Ayub also undertook. However, he
awaited a big surprise as the opposition parties fielded Fatima Jinnah as the unanimous candidate
(New York Times 1964). Ms. Jinnah was the sister of Pakistan's founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah,
making her a prestigious and popular candidate who not only drew huge crowds, but could
effectively mobilize the opposition (Haqqani 2005).
The Combined Opposition Parties under Fatima Jinnah saw a distinct chance to work for their
common objective of ridding the system of Ayub (Jalal 2014). Hence the impassioned election
campaign was witnessed across both East and West Pakistan. For the regime, consolidated as it
was—and initially confident that it could effectively manage the challenge—it was now a different
and arguably unanticipated circumstance. Hence, it started running slanderous campaign against
the candidate Fatima Jinnah. At the same, electoral manipulation was continuing too. Hence, when
the election results came, the outcome was unsurprisingly in Ayub’s favor (Jalal 2014). Here was
another instance wherein an emboldened authoritarian incumbent was demolishing opposition. As
the final tally was announced, Ayub had won a heavy majority with 64% of the result, while Miss
Fatima Jinnah secured 35% of votes (Gohar 1985, 112). This event, and the ones preceding
deepened the grievances of political parties as well as solidifying their opposition against the
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regime. Despite being pulverized electorally as well as being gagged through other tools, the
oppositional sentiments simmered.
Also, the September of 1965 witnessed the war between Pakistan and India over the disputed
territory of Kashmir (A. Ahmed 2018). This development came to bear heavily on both the Ayub
regime as well as the history of Pakistan. The decision to go to war came after and General Ayub’s
close allies in the government thought it was the right time to fight India (Jaffrelot 2015); also
because India was just humiliatingly defeated in the war against China. Being domestically
beleaguered despite a political victory against his rival, the war against India served as a wrench
for his regime on the foreign front too. Two additional factors aggravated the political atmosphere
for Ayub: The United States’ decision to stop the supply of military weapons to Pakistan, and the
East Pakistan becoming more vulnerable to air attacks by India without the ability of providing
deterrence from the West Pakistan (Gohar 1985, 113). With India making inroads to Pakistani
territory, Ayub had to rely on the Soviet Union for negotiation that resulted in Tashkent Declaration
in January 1966 (Gohar 1985). As Altaf Gohar—a trusted advisor of Ayub— recounts in his
reflections, for many Pakistanis, the treaty represented more of a betrayal, yet Ayub survived the
backlash (Gohar 1985) Also, East Pakistan simmered with anger owing to its vulnerability during
the war, and lack of support from the center. The other pitfall of the war was that the Kashmir issue
remained unsettled (Haqqani 2005, 50). It was in these extraordinarily uneasy times that Sheikh
Mujib, the President of the Awami League unfurled a six-point program for provincial autonomy
in 1966 (Jalal, 2014. 129).
To make the matters worse, Ayub’s cabinet member, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto set up his own Pakistan’
People’s Party (PPP) after his resignation from the cabinet; immediately drawing support from
different strata of society (Gohar 1985, 114). Not that there was not already widespread anger and
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disillusionment with the regime, these two factors just exacerbated the fury. It was bound to mount
significant challenge to the stability and survival of the regime. While the differences in the
oppositions’ interests, demands and strategies were undeniable, coupled with crackdown and
accompanying disarray in the initial phase, the aforementioned two developments provided the
political opposition to devise a coherent political alternative. However, despite the shared interest
in ridding the country of authoritarian regime, a combined opposition did not promptly emerge
after controversial 1965 elections and the war that impacted the incumbent. When it comes to the
opposition from the East Pakistan—led by the Awami League (AL), the six demands that they
presented for more decentralization and rights for the majority Bengalis prompted a strong reaction
by Ayub Khan (Jaffrelot 2015). Mujibur Rahman, the AL leader, along with several of party
members were arrested on the charges that their actions constituted a threat to the national cohesion
(Jaffrelot 2015). Those actions against the party fostered radicalization of the movement. Ayub’s
authority for seven years remained firm, but a gradual loosening of it was already palpable;
something that the following section highlights.
Student Movement and its Success:
As indicated above, there was a deterioration in General Ayub’s hold on power after the 1965 War
(Cheema 2002). Altaf Gohar, the Information Secretary in Ayub’s government, for example,
maintained that the war altered the political landscape for the regime (Gohar 1985). Ayesha Jalal,
also points to the disastrousness of the war, and the backlash it created for Ayub’s authoritarian
rule (Jalal 2014, 128). Additionally, economic disparities began taking their toll, manifesting
through worsening conditions for the industrial labor. And the opposition was not going to let this
opportunity go wasted. While the AL expanded its power in the East, angered by General Ayub’s
policies, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto—Ayub’s former Foreign Minister—did so in West Pakistan with the
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launch of his political party. Bhutto was successful in appealing to the more powerful political elite
in opposition to Ayub; including some senior military officers (Cheema 2002, 141).
Grievances festering for a couple of decades and the ensuing oppositional politics had already
braced the antagonist and antagonized for the eventual showdown. Tarrow sheds light on this,
demonstrating that both the challengers and authorities call upon the identities constructed during
the struggle (Tarrow 2011, 183). While there was an opening for the political parties—new and
old alike—to advance their respective movements, it was National Student Federation (NSF) that
emerged as the most active student organization in the anti-Ayub protests (Jones and O'Donnel
2012). To understand the centrality of the movement’s emergence and success, a history of student
politics in Pakistan serves as an apt context. When Pakistan got its independence, the strong and
arguably only well-established student organization was ‘Muslim Student Federation’ (MSF), an
arm of the ruling Muslim League (Paracha 2014). MSF’s expansion was aimed at bringing the
students of and young Muslims together on a platform (Paracha 2014). But Paracha also argues
that just like the Muslim League underwent a fragmentary phase as a political party after 1947, the
student wing could not also maintain organizational cohesion. It was in this backdrop that
Democratic Student Federation’s (DSF) foundation was laid, making it a new student organization
with substantial appeal due also to its progressive politics.
The student group’s rise was swift as DSF scored victories in college union elections in Karachi;
also giving an opportunity to unify other student unions (Bajwa 2019). DSF’s activism not only
aimed at pressuring the government to address students’ concerns across the country, it also started
exhibiting a more visible political disposition. For the former part, drawing a charter the
establishment of new university in Karachi, Pakistan’s then capital, DSF drew a charter in 1953.
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A ‘Demand Day’ was announced to organize a rally, which was crushed with multiple students
killed and wounded (Paracha 2014). The incident did not end the protest, though, and soon forced
the government to approve the laying foundation of Karachi University. This was a victory for the
DSF, imbuing the students with distinct confidence and raising their political consciousness.
However, its more apparent political leaning, at a time of the Cold War, earned the government’s
displeasure. DSF was opposed to the government’s inclination towards the capitalist bloc, a stance
unacceptable to the ruling dispensation (Bajwa 2019). By 1954, when the then government
imposed ban on the Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP), it also banned DSF after accusing it of
being a CPP’s student wing (Paracha 2014).
The ban was a blow to DSF, but it tried to operate, secretly, in the face of strict ban and surveillance.
Ironically, the government—as Paracha argues—patronized NSF to counter DSF and its leftist
politics. NSF, then, mostly consisted of MSF and independent conservative members (Paracha
2014). While this could have been a disadvantage for the DSF, now facing an existential threat,
some of its members started joining NSF and came to play a role in ideologically reorienting it.
The student group turned out to have a more nuanced and influential role than DSF by developing
a wider platform. The result was that NSF expanded substantially by 1957, winning elections
across the campuses to soon emerge as a replacement to DSF (Paracha 2014). What was also
noticeable about NSF was its staying in touch, and strengthening relationship with, the powerful
labour and journalist unions who happened to have strong opposition to the Ayub regime.
NSF also faced a rivalry by MSF that was now being patronized by Ayub. For NSF, confronted by
the more resourceful MSF, and regime onslaught, the proximity to the aforementioned journalist
and union leaders was crucial. The boon for NSF was the disillusionment of some otherwise
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proregime student activists and politicians after the Tashkent Declaration (discussed above).
Former MSF members started aligning themselves with NSF in the student wing’s opposition to
the regime.

As the Ayub regime prepared to celebrate its ‘Decade of Development’ in 1968, the NSF called
for ‘Decade of Decadence’ protests, as well as a ‘Week of Demands’ (Jones and O'Donnel 2012,
76). Of the major demands they made, ‘restoring democracy’ was one; something that had a mass
appeal. The movement spread fast, taking the regime by surprise, triggering a more violent
response. The epoch-changing development was the incident in the university town of Rawalpindi
in November 1968 when the police shot directly into the student rally, killing three of them (Jones
and O'Donnel 2012, 77). The killings elicited societal anger and sympathy for the students. As
Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly point out, interactions are never a one-off, or neutral events (C.T.
Tarrow 2015). What followed after the searing injustice was the movement’s ability to gain public
sympathy by highlighting the sheer travesty of not only this recent incident but also the prolonged
unrepresentative rule. This killing deepened the anger and frustration towards the regime even
among the segments of society that were apparently apolitical, or not sympathetic to the student
movement yet. What made the mobilization of students stronger and different was its ideological
appeal, one that transcended the ethnic, regional and class differences. Unlike the identity-based
political parties, and the previous episodic protests, here was a movement that had a stronger appeal
now (Jafferlot 2004). What lent a unique texture to the students’ movement was its leadership’s
particular understanding of the country, one that was a shared one and reflective of an equitable
system. These college and university students saw the dichotomy between GeneralAyub’s
autocracy and his promotion of ‘democracy’. Hence, in both East and West Pakistan students
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formed a collective movement that was no longer regionally constrained, but rather nationally
spread (Maniruzzaman 1971).

The movement gradually attracted more parties and organizations including the masses infuriated
by the growing political repression and economic inequality (Jones and O'Donnel 2012). While the
local issues were the major impetus for this expression of grievances, global events added another
layer to it. The students were aware of the anti-Vietnam movement, as well as the protests in Europe
in 1968. Those movements caught their imagination, helping them expand the scope and tactics of
their protests (Jones and O'Donnel 2012). Inspired by the effectiveness and spread of the
movement, as well as the rising inflation and increasing unemployment, industrial workers also
joined it (Jones and O'Donnel 2012, 79). By now, the movement had consolidated itself with
across-the-board support, from the political parties to peasants and members of the press. Press’
defiance in the face of gagging and censorship was a monumental development.

The pressure on General Ayub had also been building up significantly. The movement had found
a resonance across the society and was building into an effective mass. The pressure was enough
to prompt President Ayub’s announcement to not seek reelection (Jones and O'Donnel 2012, 84).
His decision can be seen as an attempt at political reform much as it was a major step towards the
handing of the power. It is here that Tarrow’s reasoning helps that sees a spiral of opportunities
and threats when a cycle of reform begins (Tarrow 2011, 159). Such an opportunity manifests itself
in the mobilization of other oppositional forces. Not that there was not an anti-Ayub sentiment in
the society, but the student movement intensified the political consciousness. While the society in
general had turned against Ayub, the institutional support began to lessen too. As was pointed out
above, the results of 1965 War and the ensuing Tashkent Declaration had already made Ayub
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unpopular. The immediate backlash came from the East Pakistan whose population was already
enduring the most of economic and political suppression. Combining the Pashtun, Baloch and
Sindhi anger at his misrule, there was no way for Ayub anymore to withstand the enormity of the
student movement and the political parties’ protests. The culmination of this mass outrage was a
whole host of individuals, professionals and dissatisfied middle class groups alike, coming together
to intensify the protests (Maniruzzaman 1971, 235). General Ayub was now willing to give more
concessions to the political opposition, including the Bengalis, but he had lost the support of his
own institution too (DAWN 2014). Hence, by March 1969, Ayub was asked by his a group of
senior military officers to resign (DAWN 2014). That meant the movement had succeeded in
forcing Ayub to finally depart, 11 years after he seized power. For General Ayub to have his own
version of democratic setup in place, his successor General Yahya imposed a martial law
throughout the country that brought the direct military rule back; but with an announcement of new
elections in 1970 (Malik 1997).
Conclusion:
The chapter provided a brief history of the country’s incipient struggle for a unanimous constitution
soon after its independence in 1947. It introduced and weighed on the political opportunity
structure theory. It showed how the participants of the initial movements challenged the imposition
and continuation of One Unit. The collective nature of the contention—revolving around the same
theme—could not win decisive victory as the regime put it down using different tactics. There were
constraints for the movement to fully ripen and form appropriate mobilizing structures owing to
the authoritarian nature of the government. The governing elite under the dictator used cooption
and coercion to weaken, crush the opposition. Nevertheless, the resistance continued, and the
opposition looked for avenues and opportunities to attain their objectives. The vulnerability of the
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regime was seen more during the 1965 election, and the subsequent war with India. Those two
factors, primarily, formed a more dynamic process for the Student Movement to not only become
central actors in the struggle against the regime, but also force the dictator to resign. The whole
struggle, since the inception of the country, was for a constitution that ensured equal citizenship.
The search for that path-determining, politico-legal document was pressing given the sheer ethnic,
religious and regional diversity of Pakistan. In a country with an absence of fully democratized
institutions, early efforts to build and solidify the foundations to have equal citizenship for
everyone remained an urgent priority. From East Pakistan, to West Pakistan, there was an
understanding that centralization and a controlled political system would disenfranchise the
minority groups. Yet, precisely those very things happened. Political system was fraught with
instability, Premiers were dismissed, and the Constitution was repealed in 1958. Importantly, once
General Ayub seized power, he consolidated his hold using the 1962 Constitution that established
a presidential system. General Ayub also went on to extend the One-Unit system; he coopted or
repressed the political forces that challenged his authority. Those who joined his newly made
party—the Conventional Muslim League’—were rewarded richly, and those who opposed him
were jailed or isolated. Also, one of the powerful movements, and a challenge to his authority, was
crushed. Bengali, Sindhi and Baloch political forces met a similar fate. Hence General Ayub
extended his rule. As he deepened his grip on power, with a bit of political opening here and there,
especially the 1965 presidential election brought the political opposition together. And as the
theory also postulates, the spirals of threats and opportunities made more room for the opposition
to strengthen itself and mount a stronger challenge to the authority. Although General Ayub won
the presidential election, the manipulation and rigging triggered further resentment. From the
grievances in East Pakistan, to his former foreign minister—Zulfiqar Bhutto laying the foundation
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of a new political party, the Ayub regime was now witnessing a proliferation of oppositional forces.
As the grievances accumulated and anger spiraled, with major economic disparities—that were
worsened by rising unemployment and inflation and political repression, it was the rise of Student
Movement that posed the most credible challenge to his authority. For the movement to emerge at
a crucial moment of the country’s checkered history, when there was substantial
instability of political alignments owing to the factors cited earlier, and the availability of strong
allies and supporters, the regime was no longer able to use its repressive tools with as much success
as it earlier did. The political opportunity structure eased the mobilization not only for the student
movement, but also the political parties that had now grown into extensive and experienced entities
with major resources at their disposal. That is how the student movement and its allies sustained
the protests when the movement broke out in 1968. And once the institutional support was no
longer as robust for General Ayub, his fellow generals advised him to step down. That marked the
end of his authority, which once ostensibly appeared impregnable, leading to General Yahya’s
declaration of martial law in 1969, instituting direct military rule with a pledge to hold free and
fair elections.
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Chapter 3: Movement for Restoration of Democracy (1981-84)

Introduction:
This chapter delves into the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (1981-1984). It will first
shed light on the rise of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto—Pakistan’s first democratically elected Prime
Minister— with the formation of his political party, Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in 1967. The
chapter chronicles Pakistan’s first general elections in 1970, and the circumstances that engendered
civil war in eastern Pakistan. It provides an account of how Bhutto inherited multiple challenges
as the leader of now a disintegrated country; and how he tried steering it out of the crisis.
Furthermore, the chapter recounts how General Zia-ul-Haq launched a military coup in July 1977
against Bhutto’s democratic government; Bhutto was then executed through a controversial
judicial proceeding. It also analyzes political developments that engendered the movement, the
Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), in 1981. Exploring the events and episodes
influencing the trajectory of this movement, the chapter unveils the conditions under which MRD
emerged, and mobilized. Two distinct and powerful but short expressions of this movement are
discussed. It shows how an initially expansive movement contracted; highlighting the actions and
events by the mobilizers as well as the response by the regime that blunted the movement. My
argument is that the movement’s rise in the initial years of General Zia’s dictatorship was
historically unparalleled; but the regime crushed it brutally as it sprang into action to fully
consolidate its grip over power. Zia unleashed deadly violence on the movement, seeing the
challengers’ any expression a threat to his survival given the regime’s widespread unpopularity.
44

Zia also succeeded in dividing the opposition through the non-party elections in 1985, and winning
supporters through massive patronage. MRD’s boycott of the elections was a supposed strategy to
highlight the illegitimacy of the process. It effectively framed the elections as fraudulent, urging
its supporters to stay away from the process. While MRD managed to have an effective frame, the
regime proved more successful in its creation of a counter movement of sorts with the participation
of contestants and voters in the elections.
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: A sketch from 1967 to 1977:
In July 1977, General Zia-ul-Haq dislodged Pakistan’s first democratically elected Prime Minister,
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto through a bloodless military coup (Jalal 2014). To understand the enormity
and consequences of this, the events that preceded it ought to be properly contextualized.
Codenamed ‘Operation Fairplay’, the 1977 coup brought about the imposition of another martial
law in the country’s checkered history, preventing the first democratic transition. Zia staged the
military coup months after the second general election since 1970 (Jalal 2014). He also dissolved
the provincial and national assemblies as well as imprisonment of the politicians opposed to this
extraconstitutional act (Jalal 2014, 217). The coup followed months long turmoil across the
Pakistani streets (Hevesi 1988). Protests erupted with the opposition groups under the banner of
Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), made up of nine anti-PPP parties. PNA included three of the
country’s main religious parties—Jamaat Islami (JI), Jamat Ulema-e Islam (JUI), Jamat Ulema-e
Pakistan (JUP), some moderate conservative parties, and a few small left-wing outfits (Jalal 2014).
JI was founded in 1941 by Abu al-A'la al-Maududi—an ideologue and a staunch proponent of
political Islam (Abbot 1957). The party had varying relationships, occasionally hostile to or
sometimes in alignment with the respective leaders’ policies after Pakistan’s independence (The
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News 2013). But JI’s most active agitation came in 1953 when it launched protests against the
Ahmadis in Punjab, leading to the imposition of first martial law. The subsequent sentencing of its
leader’s was later revoked (S. Aziz 2013). In terms of its ideology and social network and action—
as well as closeness with General Ayub in the latter years, JI had grown into a massively influential
party (S. V. Nasr 1994).
Likewise, Jamat Ulema-e Islam (JUI) was formed in 1919 with anti-colonial aims, but with the
independence of Pakistan in 1947, it split from Jamiat Ulamai Hind (JUH), and was formally
activated in 1960 by Mufti Mahmud (DAWN 2013). Unlike JI, JUI was opposed to General Ayub
and participated in opposition against his regime. Jamat Ulema-e Pakistan (JUP) was formed in
1948. Together, the alliance—thanks largely to the assemblage of religious parties like JI and JUI,
was organizationally too large and strong even for powerful PPP that had just won the reelection.
In order to understand the agitation on the streets, and the developments that followed—mainly
martial law, it is critical to detail the emergence of PPP under the aegis of Bhutto. As the previous
chapter indicated, Bhutto was a key figure in General Ayub’s cabinet. Bhutto was first appointed
Commerce Minister, and then made the country’s foreign minister in January 1963 (Rizvi 1973).
His rise was meteoric, helping him carve out a distinct political identity for himself despite General
Ayub’s power. The two developed irreconcilable differences over a host of foreign policy issues,
one of which was the Tashkent Declaration, an issue discussed in the previous chapter. Ever
ambitious and armed with a strong political roadmap for the country, Bhutto laid the foundation of
PPP in 1967 (Jaffrelot 2015). For the formation of PPP, Bhutto’s outreach to the activists and
leaders was extensive, but his prime focus were the progressive and socialist ideologues to glean
support (Khalique 2018).
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While Bhutto had his detractors, his appeal was no less substantial. He had a strong support
amongst the marginalized sections of the society because of his emphasis on egalitarianism
(Khalique 2018). Bhutto’s popularity among the peasantry was the most notable feature of his
politics. This mattered because there were already movements against colonialism and across the
globe led by or joined largely by the peasants (Khalique 2018). Bhutto’s prominence also coincided
with the calls for general elections in both wings of the country. The previous chapter detailed how
there were angry sentiments and agitations against the continued undemocratic and
unrepresentative structure that deprived the various groups and regions of their rightful share.
While the Awami League had established itself as the voice representing the majority in the eastern
wing, Bhutto’s PPP had emerged as a powerful political force in what constituted country’s western
wing.

It was this substantial societal support that helped him win a majority of the seats in the western
wing. PPP won 85 seats in a 150-member National Assembly in West Pakistan (Weinbum 1977,
601). However, in the Eastern Wing, PPP could not win even in a single constituency, completely
outdone by the Awami League which won 160 seats out of 162 (Jalal 2014, 141). AL did not secure
any seat in the western wing either. This sharp disparity in the electoral outcome was supposed to
be resolved through finding a workable power sharing formula. However, such a resolutory
arrangement did not happen. Bhutto showed reluctance in accepting the AL’s victory and allowing
it to form the government. The regime under Yahya did not show much willingness either in letting
AL form the government (Jalal 2014). The historical baggage—from the conflict over national
language to centralization through One Unit, martial law and accompanying unrepresentative
rule—just compounded the issue. With no consensus in sight and talks breaking down, and
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National Assembly session not called, ‘Operation Searchlight’ was launched by military in March
1971. The resulting catastrophic tragedy was the disintegration of Pakistan in December 1971
(Zaidi 2017). Historian Ayesha Jalal views the “institutional stakes of the military and the
bureaucracy within the existing state structure” as well as “the irreconcilable differences between
east and west Pakistani electorates and the intransigence of certain politicians” (Jalal 2014, 141)
as the reason why the ultimate tragedy unfolded with the separation of the two wings. With the
catastrophic loss of East Pakistan, the country also suffered other institutional and material losses
(Zaidi 2019). That India had 93,000 Pakistan troops as prisoners of war compounded the issues.
Bhutto had to deal with the new reality as a statesman (Jalal 2014). Not to mention the fact that he
was taking charge as the martial law administrator in what was lingering constitutional vacuum.

Bhutto’s immediate task was to confront the challenges arising out of abovementioned conundrum.
Hence he undertook an initiative to find a negotiated settlement with India to secure the release of
prisoners, and discuss other unresolved disputes arising not only of the recent conflict but also
historically. His 1972 meeting with the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi in Simla was to give
an insight into what lay ahead for the country. Historian Akbar Zaidi shows that Bhutto was able
to secure the release of Pakistani POWs, return of the territory, as well as both states’ acceptance
of the ceasefire line in Kashmir as the Line of Control (Zaidi 2019). Bhutto’s successful diplomacy
added to his political stature in a country recovering from the ravages of 1971 war.

For Bhutto, another vital issue was the framing of the country’s constitution (Ziring 1977).
Previous chapter detailed how the debate over the nature of the political system lingered on for
years with the failure to have an acceptable Constitution. But the martial law in 1958 led to
suspension of first Constitution and then its complete reorientation by the dictator in 1962. Now
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that a major part of country was gone, and a new framework needed, the challenge had doubled.
The distribution of powers between the center and the provinces once again emerged as the central
question, and the kind of executive suitable for Pakistan (Choudhury 1974, 10). There was a
discordant group of nationalists and Islamists that Bhutto was supposed to bring to the table in
order to win an agreement for the draft. In extraordinary times and surrounded by numerous
challenges, his government eventually succeeded in bringing about a constitutional framework
with the majority voting for it in the parliament (Jaffrelot 2015). On August 14, 1973, Bhutto
became the first democratically elected Prime Minister as the Constitution with the parliamentary
form of government came into being (Zaidi 2019).
Popularity and Opposition:
Since Bhutto had come to power by inserting socialism into his manifesto, his government took
some policy measures that continue to impact his legacy. Specifically, it was his policy to
nationalize the industry, banks and charitable trust educational institutions that impacted the sectors
considerably (Khalique 2018). He also put in place land reform that brought the ceiling to 150
acres from 500; and a new code was prescribed that obligated the land owners to meet the cost of
inputs for production as well as the land development (Burki 1974). These policies had differing
impacts across the provinces. While those macroeconomic policies drew varying responses among
different classes, the 1973 oil crisis triggered inflation in the country, forcing Bhutto’s government
to devalue the currency (Burki 1974). Traders and businessmen alike did not like the government’s
approach to economic policy and began to transfer capital that created crisis (DAWN 2014).
However, it was managed, and economic recovery was somewhat pacifying the opposition.
However, Bhutto took other measures that illustrated not only of his growing confidence, but
also—as an unintended consequence—created newer enemies. Military operations in Balochistan,
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a province where he barely had any electoral victory or political allies, created a lot of resentment
towards his government. Nonetheless, opposition was gathering steam against what his rivals saw
as ‘dictatorial’ rule. There were already calls for his removal or calling new elections. Bhutto
considered himself strong and popular enough to announce early elections in 1977 (Weinbum
1977). However, he was taken off-guard when the seemingly divided opposition decided to fight
elections against him (DAWN 2014). The opposition groups were now made of nine anti-PPP
parties, coming under the umbrella of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), constituting a gamut of
conservative and left-wing parties (DAWN 2014).

While Bhutto’s sociopolitical policies won him popularity and support, there were sections of the
society that felt negatively affected by them. PNA came to represent those voices. Those
particularly vocal in this regard were businessmen, industrialists, traders, shopkeepers, the
antiBhutto landed gentry and urban middle-classes (Weinbum 1977). It is these classes, as the
following discussion on MRD demonstrates, that the regime tried to coopt. With the
antigovernment sentiments sharpening, PNA levelled some serious charges against Bhutto;
denunciating him a civilian dictator and oppressor who had unleashed violence on the opposition
(DAWN 2014). Particularly strategically, PNA portrayed itself as most opposed to socialism,
something that Bhutto prided his political policy in (Jalal 2014).

With the elections nearing, PNA mobilized its supporters across the country. PPP under Bhutto did
feel threatened by the incoming political storm, but it exhibited confidence, certain about a major
electoral victory. It was this confidence that was on display during the election campaign. On the
election day, as the voting ended, PPP surprised the opposition with its dominant victory, securing
over 150 seats as opposed to PMNA which only obtained 36 seats (Weinbum 1977, 613). For PPP,
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as is argued, the win represented an endorsement of its policies and continued legitimacy in the
eyes of the public. However, finding itself off-guard by the results, the opposition PNA accused
PPP of manipulation and massive interference in elections, including arbitrarily ruling people of
the ballots in dozens of cases (Weinbum 1977, 613).
PNA was already a strong alliance; and it soon began another round of protests the election results.
PPP assumed that the opposition would subside due to the former’s popularity. But it amounted to
underestimating PNA which continued building pressure for the reversal of the results. From the
mosques to bazars, street activities by the opposition against Bhutto saw an uptick (B. Ahmed
2018). Karachi was the metropolitan where the civil disobedience, and acts of violence brought the
economic life to standstill that also adversely impacted the national economy (Weinbum 1977,
615). Seeing the political temperature rising, even though the military had expressed support for
the government, Bhutto in negotiation with PNA decided to offer an olive branch (B. Ahmed 2018).

The PNA decided to protest until its demands were met: from the resignation of the Prime Minister,
reelection, release of the political leaders, to bringing in a new impartial election commission (Jalal
2014, 214). Bhutto accepted most demands except agreeing to volunteering resignation. However,
as is argued by Jalal, the PPP was probably a bit late for agreeing to the demands as the opposition
had already established contact with the military leadership. The opposition, in its behind the
scenes meeting with the military, had laid down additional demands, two of which included the
end of army operation in Balochistan and termination of tribunal against the NAP leaders (Jalal
2014, 214). Zia refused to accept the latter two demands and went on to launch the unexpected but
dreaded military coup in July 05, 1977.
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Martial Law and Movement for Restoration of Democracy:
As General Zia took charge, he pledged to hold elections within 90 days (Saeed 2017, 149).
However, probably not to the surprise of many, he did not live up to his promise. In 1978, Zia
appointed himself the President of Pakistan, suspended the1973 Constitution, and imposed a host
of martial law regulations (Saeed 2017). This was third martial law in as many decades of the
country’s history since its independence in 1947. With the democratically elected government
dismantled, Zia exercised every possible means to consolidate his power. In order not only to win
the support of sections of society but also to spread terror and discourage any kind of mobilization
by the opposition, he introduced laws that also allowed public flogging and the imputation of hands
(Toor 2011, 102). The regime was aware of its own unpopularity, and the continued discussion
about Bhutto’s imprisonment and his potential challenge to Zia’s unconditional rule. It was this
calculation that prompted Zia to also initiate a judicial trial of the former Premier, accusing him of
the murder of a political rival (New York Times 1979). The trial continued for months, causing
enormous polarization in the country. On February 1979, the Supreme Court bench delivered a 43
verdict (Jalal 2014, 221) condemning Bhutto to death. The judgement was deeply shocking, a
decision that was opposed both domestically and internationally. The controversy surrounding the
trials, particularly the change of Chief Justices during the proceedings (New York Times 1979),
linger to date.
It is in this context that the movement under study—Movement for Restoration of Democracy
(MRD)— grows in importance. As is argued by Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, social
movements require a few critical elements for them to engage in contention. Regime’s repressive
tactics can have significant impact on the collective claim making, but the sympathy and support
among the masses as well as the availability of influential allies boost the movement, spurring it
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into action (Tilly and Tarrow 2015). The emergence of MRD in February 1981, merely two years
after Bhutto’s hanging under repressive martial regime demonstrates that. In the absence of the
Bhutto, it was his daughter, Benazir Bhutto (BB), who took the political mantle, becoming the
cochairperson of PPP (Azeem and Salim 2019)—and finding allies to mobilize against an
authoritarian setup.
BB entered into an uneasy political dialogue and alliance with the very parties who spearheaded
PPP’s ousting—including PNA (the aforementioned discussion on PNA’s countrywide protests
against PPP government serves as an evidence of it). With a conflictual history between the allies
constituting the movement, PPP cadres resented sharing the platform with the yesteryear’s rivals.
However, BB—particularly her mother Nusrat Bhutto—threw their support to the movement
(Paracha 2020). Hence, the birth of MRD presents an interesting emergence and evolution of
oppositional politics against the authoritarian rule. The coming together of political entities who
had some logistical and mobilizational capacity added another layer in the movement. The alliance
constituted PPP, Awami National Party (ANP), Pakistan Muslim League (Khwaja Khairuddin
group), Pakistan Democratic Party, Tehreek-e-Istiqlal, Awami Tehreek, Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam,
and Mazdoor Kissan Party. These parties had presence all over Pakistan with a range of ideological
components: From the rightist to the liberal and Marxist parties. MRD’s emergence was a distinct
development for the country’s history. It was comparatively different in its orientation from the
Student Movement in that the former was undertaken by the political parties. If any alliance had
some similarity with MRD, it was NAP. Not only because both were invested in reestablishing
democracy, but also in the diversity of political leanings of the parties involved.
MRD’s foremost demand was the restoration of democracy which essentially meant the end of
martial law too. The revival of 1973 Constitution was contingent on democratic process’s return.
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Although MRD had a countrywide representation, it exercised an enormously powerful sway in
Sindh—the birthplace of Bhuttos. The fact that the regime did not even allow proper burial of
Zulfiqar Bhutto after his execution left a legacy of its own in the province. Accordingly, the regime
was more sharply focused on the MRD’s bastion to avert any kind of threat to its own survival.
MRD leaders were aware of both their limitations and strengths with regards to the regime’s
repressive tools. Amid the strict ban in place on the political parties and their activities, it was
Nusrat Bhutto who—clad as a grandmother to evade identification and arrest—traveled to Lahore
by train to organize protests (Paracha 2020). MRD did not only have to contend with the regime,
but also its political allies like JI which had irreconcilable ideological differences with PPP. JI was
a force with which the regime intended to have its countermobilization. JI joining the Zia-led
cabinet was a patronization that helped the regime (Ahmad 2015) even though the party initially
considered supporting the movement. On the other hand, regime had already started its crackdown
on MRD, arresting its leaders across the country, including Benazir Bhutto herself (Azeem and
Salim 2019).
As MRD’s protests gradually began gathering some support, its leaders also announced holding a
rally on March 23, a day celebrated as Pakistan. The leaders wanted to demonstrate the alliance’s
strength, and also pressure the regime, through the planned gathering. However, it had to be called
off after the the hijacking of the Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) —a flight bound to Karachi
from Peshawar—in the same month. The terrorist incident sent shockwaves across the country
(Jalal 2014, 236). It was Murtaza Bhutto, Zulfiqar Bhutto’s son, whose newly formed outfit
AlZulfiqar orchestrated the hijacking (Jalal 2014) (Paracha 2020). The hijackers had allegedly
included PPP supporters who forced the plane to land in Soviet-occupied Kabul, Afghanistan
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(Jalal 2014) . Historian Ayesha Jalal also highlights how Murtaza’s armed struggle was undertaken
without the approval of his sister (Benazir Bhutto), and mother (Nusrat Bhutto). Nevertheless, after
the hijacking, pro-regime supporters blamed Benazir and Nusrat for the incident. It took over 10
days for the negotiation, and the release of 54 political prisoners by General Zia, for the safe release
of the passengers on board (Abbas 2017). However, the opposition bore the brunt of this terrorist
incident because they were accused of its orchestration (Abbas 2017). MRD was now facing an
existential crisis barely a few weeks into its formation.
General Zia declared the terrorist incident externally supported, denouncing the opposition
leadership for it (Jalal 2014). While MRD condemned the terrorist incident and disassociated itself
from it, the whole episode politically benefited General Zia who not only used it to extend his
authoritarian rule (Abbas 2017), but also to delegitimize the movement (Rizvi 2000, 179). What
was obvious from the immediate backlash after the terrorist incident was that the impact on the
movement was almost irreversible (Paracha 2020). Amid new arrests and accompanying repression
of the movement activists, courts did not have autonomy either to dispense justice. Likewise, any
legal battle involving restoration of the Constitution through the courts seemed impractical for the
movement. The conclusion that the Court would not restore the Constitution was based on how
Bhutto was sent to gallows by the judges. The future seemed bleak for the movement which had
begun with some promise. However, MRD was not completely demobilized.
Its activities, though, were increasingly curtailed. In the intervening period, Zia’s legal team also
started using introducing amendments in the Constitution. Most of the changes were made using
the ‘Islamization’ umbrella (Paracha 2020). This was Zia’s way of not only gaining some
semblance of legitimacy, but also ensure a smooth and unchallenged long military rule in the
country. Zia’s projection of his rule as a ‘moral antidote to Bhuttoism’ (Jalal 2014, 224). It was
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undoubtedly appealing to the anti-Bhutto economic and political sections of the society who also
did not have any sympathy for MRD’s movement. The ongoing Soviet-led War in Afghanistan
made his support for the anti-Soviet Capitalist camp equally important (Jaffrelot, The Pakistan
Paradox: Instability and Resilience 2015); and it was here that Zia could rally on the United States
support for his regime in order to fight as an ally against the Communist invasion of Afghanistan.
This new external reality, reshaping the country’s foreign policy, was politically expedient for the
regime. There would not be much global pressure on it to restore democracy. Repression of the
opposition, then, continued unabated while MRD tried to find a way out of the political and
mobilization morass it found itself in.
MRD and its second wave of protests—1983:
Zia regime’s consolidation was underway with all the administrative, constitutional, and policy
decisions that he was swiftly implementing. The international support—or even the international
actors’ neutrality that would manifest itself in not supporting the democratic struggle, would come
handy for the regime. Under the circumstances, however, MRD did not stay fully inactive. If
anything, the continued reengineering of the polity through different policies was a cause against
which the movement had to rally against. Granted that its leaders were facing persecution, the
movement leaders attempted regain the 1981-like momentum with its sense of purpose intact. In
1983, the movement jumped to the fray with an announcement of civil disobedience with the
demand that the regime leave power and hold new elections (Ahmad 2015). In the new cycle of
protest, it was the repertoires that the movement chose that are of significance. While the
movement was faced with more propaganda and repression, it persisted in its metaphorical march.
MRD strategically opted for a set of symbolic dates to protest against the regime. They included
the day the movement’s foundation was laid, February 6 as the ‘Day of Democracy’; the day Zia
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declared martial law, July 5 as the ‘Dark Day’; and the country’s Independence Day on August 14
also as the ‘Day of the Renewing the Pledge (Ahmad 2015, 129-130). The Independence Day was
also chosen as the occasion to launch civil disobedience. These protests with their immense
symbolism had an emotional appeal to the public, and drew some response. Some of its activists
also started giving voluntary arrests across the country.
Realizing well that the movement could seriously pose a challenge to the martial law, Zia used a
number of ways to neutralize the movement. The regime first adopted measures that effectively
gagged print media, placing restrictions on the publication of anything that constituted dissent
(Rizvi 2000, 179). Zia-led dispensation also banned pamphlets that were anti-regime, with
punishment for both the publishers and those distributing the printed materials. The military’s
outsized power was an undeniable reality. It imposed restrictions on the movements of the political
leaders and activists alike; and even indoor meetings were disbarred (Rizvi 2000). Periodic house
arrest of prominent leaders belonging to the movement, short and long detention of the activists
and leaders were parts of the tactics employed by the regime (Paracha 2015). While MRD’s call
had generated a response that was not fully lukewarm, it did not have enough influence for the
movement to pressurize the regime. Hence, MRD called off the civil disobedience without
achieving its main objectives (Ahmad 2015).
Calling off the protests had other reasons too, particularly the way the regime was in an overdrive
to divide the opposition. It is germane to highlight how parallel political forces— mostly sectarian,
parochial and other segmented elements were used by the regime (H. A. Rizvi, Military, State and
Society in Pakistan 2000, 180). Zia was conscious of Bhutto’s appeal across the country, mainly
in Punjab where the latter exercised unprecedented electoral and political influence despite
belonging to Sindh (Jaffrelot and Rais 1998). Hence, Zia adopted a two-fold policy that was
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designed to put a dent to Bhutto’s continued appeal in other parts of the country. Firstly, he
undertook patronization of the classes that had been politically affected by Bhutto’s government
(Paracha 2015). The previous section highlighted this point, showing how while Bhutto’s
economic policies won him popularity, it created deep animosity too. The conservative groups, in
particular, were successfully patronized by the regime to oppose MRD and PPP (Rizvi 2000).
Zia then set in economic policies that were geared towards wooing Punjab’s urban middle- and
lower middle-class traders and shopkeepers (Paracha 2015).
The impact of this patronage had tangible impact where some classes saw an uptick in their income
(Ahmad 2015, 27). The regime was able to tame and incorporate the landed and business elite,
thereby defanging any opposition to Zia in the province from the economic interests, and
neutralizing MRD irreversibly (Kalra and Butt 2019). No less significant was Zia regime’s decision
to go after the student unions in the country. The previous section elaborated how students were
able to organize an effective, anti-Ayub movement that eventually led to the downfall of martial
law administrator. As Sadia Toor points out, the 1968-69 student movement was fresh on the
military establishment’s mind, hence political activities were proscribed in the colleges and
universities after Zia imposed a ban on the student unions (Toor 2011).
However, Sindh—based on PPP’s popularity continued witnessing mobilizations, including
voluntary arrests and staging protest rallies that included a variety of anti-Zia opposition groups
(Paracha 2015). Professor Khalid Syeed, for example, illustrates the massive support that the MRD
had in Sindh, especially among the religious leaders who saw Zia’s strategy with deep suspicion
(Sayeed 1984). But an opposition to the regime, and then translating this opposition into effective
political action are two distinct phenomena. The support that MRD was arguably significant; but
on the ground, it was not tangible and sufficient enough outside Sindh to force the regime to leave.
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With other parts of the country witnessing MRD’s marginalization, Sindh was now regime’s focus
to neutralize the movement. This was also a time when some fringe elements in the movement
were agitating violently against the wishes of MRD leadership (Ahmad 2015). While a group of
unruly protesters attacked, robbed and burnt a number of public places in Sindh despite the MRD
leader’s opposition to any acts of violence, the regime also unleashed violence across the province.
The protesters had turned violent after the arrest of Makhdoom Khalil-ul-Zaman (Ahmad 2015).
Over the months, violence reigned in the province; and the regime’s operations led to as many as
400 deaths along with thousands of arrests across the province (N. Khan 2010). MRD by now had
lost the momentum to effectively run its political campaign.
The particularly strong blow to MRD as a movement was General Zia’s announcement to hold a
referendum in December 1984. This came at the wake of increased violence used to force an end
of the agitational politics against the repressive regime. Likewise, as the argument in the
dissertation puts forth, the regime in the initial years employs all tactics in its arsenal, through the
state apparatus, to discourage any opposition. The element of surprise lay with the regime, hence
it decided to have a countrywide referendum to ‘elicit the people’s will’ (S. Aziz 2015). MRD
vehemently opposed the referendum but the unrelenting opposition could hardly have an impact
on Zia whose advisors sought to word the referendum vote such that the resistance remain minimal.
Zia used religious invocation, portraying himself as someone for the salvation of religion and
country (S. Aziz 2015). Despite the boycott of MRD, when the referendum result was announced,
Zia had won with over 97.7 percent voters endorsing his policies (Burki and Baxter 1991, 172).
For MRD, the sheer manipulation and twisting of the system amounted to another effort by the
regime to legitimize and perpetuate its rule.
In 1984, certain that his regime is solidly unchallenged, and also to ease pressure, Zia announced
elections on the non-party basis (Mufti, Shafqat and Siddiqui 2020). With movement largely
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blunted, Zia then tried to pacify the restive province through nominating a Sindhi—Mohammad
Khan Junejo—as Prime Minister in 1985. He also brought in other high-profile leaders, mostly
anti-MRD, to his Advisory Council to better his credentials and shore up support. That worked
effectively in that the supporters of such political figures in the province came under the
patronization of the government, benefiting and getting largely adjusted to new status quo. Zia
additionally made some changes in the Constitution in 1985 that tightened his grip on power (Burki
and Baxter 1991, 172). As for the MRD, it boycotted the elections knowing fully well that the
process would be as manipulated as the referendum was. However, some of its leaders also
assumed that a predominant majority would stay away from the elections because of its boycott.
However, the participation of new entrants in the elections, and the regime’s identification and
cooption of some opposition leaders significantly strengthened it at the expense of MRD’s further
political marginalization. It gradually lost the political steam even in the province, Sindh, that was
once its remaining power base. Although the movement retained its presence, at least on the paper,
it did not and could not affect much substantive change that could bring about the end of dictatorial
rule (Mufti, Shafqat and Siddiqui 2020, 52) afterwards.
Conclusion:
This chapter explored the emergence and evolution of Movement for Restoration of Democracy
(MRD). Importantly, after discussing the holding of Pakistan’s first general elections in 1970, 23
years after its independence, and the accompanying events were discussed incomplete sentence. In
understanding MRD, the examination of this bit of history constituted critical informational and
analytical element in the development of the movement. While MRD made inroads in its attempts
to restore democracy, the chapter also showed how the Zia regime used counternarrative to
delegitimize MRD in the eyes of public and damage its appeal. The timing of the movement
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seemed opportune for the leaders given the anger directed against the regime after the hanging of
Prime Minister Bhutto. However, as this dissertation has argued, authoritarian regimes come down
harder on the movements when the former are in the consolidating phase. The coercive and
incentivizing tactics deployed by the regime worked for it as it coopted and erected new political
forces to counter MRD. The ability to shrink and contain the movement to one province—that is,
Sindh—cut its support and mobilizational capacity from other parts of the country. The use of force
also impacted it greatly and reduced it. However, regardless of the eventual outcome, in that the
movement could not attain its basic objectives, it remains part of the historical and political
consciousness of the country. To date, it is seen as a courageous and momentous political
undertaking for change during an extremely repressive and tyrannical time. The fact that it
somehow managed to force Zia into holding the general elections of 1985—regardless of the fact
that it was Zia’s political move or a concession engendered by MRD—could be argued as an event
that followed MRD’s campaign.
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Chapter 4: 2007 Lawyers Movement

Introduction:
This chapter explores the 2007 Pakistan Lawyers’ Movement. This occupies a central place in
Pakistan’s political history. What makes it significant is the largescale mobilization of lawyers and
civil society who struggled for the reinstatement of the Supreme Court Chief Justice (SCCJ),
Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, after he was removed by President General Pervez Musharraf, a
military general who came to power after a bloodless coup in 1999 (Raza 2007). I will show how
the movement began with the narrow demand of restoring the deposed judge in the first phase from
March 2007 to July 2007; and then went on to transform into a movement with much bigger and
bolder demand of President Musharraf’s resignation, and the independence of the judiciary as a
whole from November 2007 to March 2009. The chapter also shows how the proliferation of
electronic news media changed the calculus for the movement, giving it more visibility and
popularity across the country. The preceding discussion on the contentious politics against two
other military dictators, General Ayub Khan and Genera Zia-ul-Haq, has shown how the
authoritarian regimes used coaxing and coercing to defang the opposition. This chapter throws
light on how Musharraf deployed a wide variety of strategies, including introducing a façade of
democracy, to not only break the major political parties through coopting their key leaders in the
coalition government, but also victimize others on corruption charges through its accountability
campaign run through National Accountability Bureau (NAB). Amid numerous hurdles and
constraints, it is no less powerfully symbolic and ultimately transformative that the Lawyers
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Movements originated in March 2007 and continued until its accomplishment of key objectives in
March 2009— from the reinstatement of the deposed Chief Justice, resignation of President
Musharraf and then the restoration of judges who were deposed after the November 2007 with the
proclamation of state of emergency. (M. I. Khan 2009).
The chapter illustrates how the opening avenues for contention in the forms of a more activist
judiciary, an expanding and assertive civil society and burgeoning media blunted the repressive
tactics of the authoritarian regime in its later phase. Also, I argue with evidence how the regime in
its incipient, consolidatory phase was more suppressive in stifling, subduing and undoing
opposition. However, with favorable political context available for the movement after some
time—the favorable public opinion and influential allies changed the calculus. The argument is
that the immutability of the political environment allowed the challengers in the latter phase to
engage in collective action—one that found appeal among substantial sections of the society. The
movement’s ability to use a frame that connected them to otherwise apathetic or neutral groups
helped it immensely. Of particular importance is how civil society became part of the movement
even though its rise lay in Musharraf’s policies of economic liberalization.
Military Coup and Regime Consolidation:
In 1998, Pakistan’s then Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif appointed Pervez Musharraf, as the army
chief of the staff (K. Khan 1999). Nawaz promoted Musharraf while at least two other generals
ranked above him in terms of seniority (Jaffrelot, 2015). Nawaz Sharif rose to power as his party,
Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, won a crushing majority in 1997 elections (Jaffrelot, 2015).
Even though Musharraf’s appointment was supposedly meant to bridge the gap between the
military and civilian leadership on policy issues, both Musharraf and Nawaz soon developed
their own differences. Foreign policy was the key bone of contention between the two, and the
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1999’s Kargil War—involving Pakistan and India—worsened the relations between the civilian
and military leadership. The crisis boiled over in October 1999 when Nawaz decided to replace
Musharraf as COAS with his the former’s close ally, Lt. General Khwaja Ziauddin (K. Khan 1999).
The decision was taken while Musharraf was on an official visit to Sri Lanka. But the replacement
and dismissal could not be implemented due to the resistance to the decision (K. Khan 1999). With
Musharraf’s return, and a military coup that dislodged Sharif, Pakistan was in the throes of another
authoritarian rule. Musharraf quickly moved against Nawaz, sending him and his party’s main
leaders to the jail.
The General dissolved the parliament, issued Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) and put the
constitution in abeyance (Jamal 2013). Musharraf declared himself ‘Chief Executive’, instead of
Martial Law Administrator unlike his predecessors (Jalal 2014, 312). In May 2000, a few months
after the military takeover, the Supreme Court validated the coup (Jazeera 2008). There was
effectively no legal hurdle for him now. By June 2000, Musharraf also appointed himself the
President of Pakistan, simultaneously holding office of Chief of Army Staff and Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff Committee (DAWN 2013). The regime filed a case against Nawaz Sharif to
prevent his participation in politics, alleging him of ‘hijacking’ Musharraf’s plane (Jalal 2014).
Nawaz was subsequently sentenced to life imprisonment by the anti-terrorist court (Guardian
2000). With the PMLN supremo facing an uncertain fate, and the political system in disarray, the
surest sign of any resistance against the regime came in December 2000 when an array of
opposition parties cobbled together Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD) (DAWN
2001). However, as I argue in the following sections, the regime had already devised a way to
ward off any serious challenge to it despite the seeming strength of the alliance. Additionally,
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Nawaz leaving for Saudi Arabia through a deal with the regime and the kingdom, on a condition
that he stay away from politics for 10 years (Abbas 2018), also dealt a blow to the movement.
On the other hand, Musharraf also wanted to have the judges take fresh oath under PCO. However,
while most judges did take the oath, a few of them resisted, opting instead to resign (Jalal 2014).
Interestingly, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry was among the judges who took oath as Chief Justice
Balochistan High Court (BHC) (BBC 2012). Chaudhry’s career trajectory as the Apex Court judge
continued and became the Chief Justice in 2005 (M. I. Khan 2009). Unlike MRD that exerted
enormous pressure through its agitational politics in the incipient stage of Zia’s martial law, the
opposition against Musharraf was arguably not as robust. A short overview of the late 1980s, and
1990s tumultuous politics brings to fore a story of irreconcilability between the country’s two
largest political parties: PMLN and PPP. Severe differences that existed between PPP and PMLN
created enormous difficulty in their supposed joint struggle for democracy (Jaffrelot 2015). What
transpired in the two decades could only prove detrimental for the democratic process itself. When
the PPP formed a government in 1988, after a decade of the military rule, PMLN played a key role
in its dismissal by 1990 through its unyielding campaign. PPP, on the other hand, did not relent in
its oppositional politics. It is the back and forth between the two rivals along with a host of
complicating historical, institutional factors, that witnessed PMN government’s being dismissed
in 1993, and then the dissolution of PPP-led government in 1997 (BBC 2019). Likewise, when
PMLN won an enormous electoral victory in 1997’s general elections, the profound differences
between civilian and military leaderships respectively under Nawaz and Musharraf persisted. With
Musharraf’s 1999 military coup put an end to the budding democracy (K. Khan 1999).
Also, I contend that when the regime is in its incipient phase, it employed and mobilizes more
resources through its powerful apparatus to disengage and dent opposition. Musharraf policies
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corroborate the contention. One of the first means that he employed was the use of National
Accountability Bureau (NAB), an anti-corruption body with sweeping powers to investigate and
arrest (Cohen, General Pervez Musharraf: saviour or destroyer of Pakistan's democracy? 2002).
While Nawaz government also went after the opposition with its ‘anti-corruption’ campaign,
imprisoning several PPP leaders, accountability also became a buzzword for regime under
Musharraf (Z. Hussain 2019). Musharraf gave sweeping powers to NAB. The body could arrest
the accused of financial corruption and keep them detained up to 90 days. Zahid Hussain points to
the regime’s implementation of NAB Ordinance under which the special courts would bar the
convicted from holding any public office for 21 years (Z. Hussain 2019). It proved handy in forcing
the politicians to join the pro-government parties and electoral alliance. Ayesha Jalal highlights
how a list of 320 individuals was issued who were accused of owing debts to banks. The list
included the names of Nawaz Sharif, his brother—Shahbaz Sharif—and former Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto; all essentially leading the country’s two foremost political parties (Jalal 2014,
313). This was a setback for those parties. Members had to choose between their political careers
being either stalled or destroyed or they had to join coalition formed under Musharraf’s aegis.
Those who joined the coalition would then have their cases withdrawn. Having cornered the
opposition considerably, Musharraf decided to not only hold general elections, but also a national
referendum in 2002 to extend his presidency for another five years (Jalal 2014) .
While both ARD and other opposition groups condemned the General’s plan to perpetuate his rule
through referendum, fair and free elections were not likely either under the circumstances.
However, as I have argued in the dissertation, regime’s initial years are geared towards, and more
focused on, consolidating its power through a variety of means. Musharraf’s tactic involved not
only a relentless legal and repressive pressure on PMLN and other opposition parties, it also used
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rewards to sway the rivals. The regime’s tactics worked effectually. A substantial number of PML
leaders splintered, joining Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-e Azam Group (PML-Q) (N. F. Paracha
2017). Christophe Jaffrelot has pointed to how the new entity was renamed to portray it as the party
drawing its legitimacy from the name of country’s founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah—
something that Musharraf also referred to in his autobiography (Jaffrelot 2015, 348). The creation
of the PMLQ was also meant for the General to ground himself in the political culture.

Additionally, new electoral law was introduced that required the candidates to have graduate
degrees to contest elections; such a requirement would automatically disqualify the seasoned
politicians who did not have the degrees (Mehdi 2013). All this was designed to prevent any
meaningful opposition being formed inside or outside the parliament in an election which itself
was suspect. It was through Muslim League-Q that government was formed in 2002 (Mehdi 2013).
Muslim League-N, that had won the predominant majority in the 1997 elections, was reduced to
only 15 seats, a setback that it could not easy undo. PML-Q formed a comfortable majority, able
to form a coalition government. Musharraf, emboldened, then issued Legal Framework Order
(LFO) in in the same year; restoring authority to the President to dissolve the parliament, and to
relieve both the Prime Minister and cabinet of their functions (Talbot 2004). It had several other
provisions that would greatly impact the constitutional structure. Musharraf’s decision to have the
LFO passed through a two-third majority faced considerable resistance in the parliament for over
a year. However, despite the continued opposition to it, the General—through his allies—was
successful in averting any untoward challenge to his rule. There was no effective political challenge
to his authoritarian government from the divided and frayed opposition apart from the clamoring
in the parliament for Musharraf’s leaving his military office. This is where the judiciary’s activism
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was a game-changer. A few years after validating the military coup, a somewhat activistic
judiciary was now being seen as encroaching Musharraf’s turf (M. I. Khan 2009).

Judicial Activism:
Previous chapters have shown how the earlier movements in the country had different dynamics.
If the struggle against General Ayub was spearheaded by students, thereby gaining a widespread
and holistic societal support that eventually forced him to resign, the one against General Zia was
led by the political parties. While the latter also had some support initially by mostly dispersed
civil society, it could not force Zia to give major incentives to the movement barring the non-party
elections in 1985. As for the lawyers and the court, the movement’s dynamics demand some more
discussion. In authoritarian setups, courts do not generally enjoy autonomy and are seen as an
institution that can help the regime exercise both administrative and social control (Ghias 2010).
In all three regimes, courts’ role remained somewhat unchanged, somehow giving legitimacy to
each setup through their respective judgements. Also, as noted in the previous chapter, Pakistan’s
first elected Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, was sent to gallows by a SC decision; and both
General Ayub and Zia’s coups were legitimized by the respective court’s decisions.
It is in this context that the judicial activism after 2007 merits attention because not only did the
judiciary and bar’s role constituted a divergence from the past, it also set off a more robust round
of oppositional politics against Musharraf. And in the mobilization that followed, when the General
demanded Iftikhar Chaudhry’s resignation, the CJ demonstrated an unexpected defiance, which
would also be a catalyst of change. It is an altogether different debate if it was a principled stance,
or one based more on the judge’s self-interest. However, the stand reshaped the country’s politics.
Up until 2005 when Chaudhry was elevated as the Chief Justice Supreme Court (CJSC), the court

68

and Military General had a normal relationship. It was during and after 2005 that Chaudhry started
hearing petitions and taking suo moto actions against the highhandedness of the government
officials (M. I. Khan 2009). He also ordered probes into politically contentious cases which
Musharraf-led regime considered falling exclusively in its domain. Also, CJ also started hearing
cases that involved the regime’s economic policies (Ghias 2010, 996).
Two cases in particular fueled the crisis with Musharraf regime in 2006-07. One of these cases
involved Pakistan Steel Mills, and the other was on the enforced disappearances of civilians (S.
Shafqat 2018). With the War on Terror at its peak, the number of disappearances reported in
Supreme Court had increased (Review 2010). For the courts to hear such cases formed a
discomforting problem for Musharraf, and undermined his image. The growing dissatisfaction with
Chaudhry’s role resulted in him being summoned to Pakistan Army House on March 9, 2007
(Benjamin 2007). General Musharraf asked the CJ to resign apparently over allegations of
misconduct. (M. I. Khan 2009). However, Chaudhry refused to resign, triggering an unpredictable
crisis; one that would culminate with a countrywide movement. Because private channels had
proliferated, and the media enjoyed a little bit of freedom, the meeting and its outcome were widely
reported. Musharraf, surprisingly, then took a legal route to address the crisis.
The regime filed a reference against Chaudhry in the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) (Dawn
2007). There were several allegations against the CJ that included his falsification of expenses,
harassing fellow judges, bias in appointment and also intimidating different public officials
(Haider, Reuters 2007). The charges were strongly denied by CJ himself and his legal team.
Importantly, Pakistan Bar Council (PBC), which represents the lawyers across the country, threw
his support for the CJ; a monumental decision that reverberated far and wide. This was a major
development considering the outsized role of the PBC. The Bar is regulated by the Legal
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Practitioners and Bar Councils Act of 1973; overseeing all the provincial bars as well as Supreme
Court Bar Associated; in effect a body representing, regulating and determining the levels lawyers
practice the law in the country (S. Shafqat 2018). Its legal and political influence remains
undisputed. Having previously highlighted how the judiciary had endorsed different military
regimes’ steps, it is critical to note how the bars did not see eye to eye with the bench. Hence this
support for the judge represented a palpable shift. PBA’s decision brought the bar and judiciary
together; the latter people with some qualified and famous leaders that also included the retired
judges (Ghias 2010). These leaders had a wide following across the political divide, lending their
voices more credibility, strength and legitimacy. Media trying to assert its independence factored
into the movement’s spread too; and how it would frame the struggle.
As pointed out earlier, regimes tend to loosen restrictions during the consolidated phase. Such a
leeway is usually demonstrative of its confidence to withhold any opposition. However, precisely
this is utilized by the raft of opposition parties when opportunities present themselves. The impact
of mass media on the evolution of this movement cannot be emphasized enough. Ironically, it was
Musharraf himself who had opened the airwaves to private competition in 2002. The decision led
to palpable transformation in the media landscape (Markey 2013), gradually breaking the
monopoly that the country’s only state-run television channel—PTV—had. Private TV channels
aired daily talk shows where both the government and opposition’s representatives were invited to
discuss the political developments. By now, unchanneled anger against Musharraf was articulated
and relayed by the opposition leaders on the TV screens.
Perhaps the most dramatic moment in the evolution of the movement was CJ Chaudhry being
dragged by his hair into a police vehicle on the first morning of his appearance (Newsweek 2007).
The image was caught by the camera eye; and was subsequently flashed on the TV channels. The
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scene was quite unusual and instigated tremendous anger. Doron Shultziner’s ‘transformative
event’ captures the enormity of this photo in shifting the movement momentum. Transformative
events are the ones that can trigger political (Shultziner 2018, 54). The CJ being dragged by his
hair—and the footage being continually shown on TV channels—constituted an escalation, an
insult to the country’s chief justice that was neither tolerable for the legal community nor public at
large. The regime deemed its control unassailable, and still being in charge. However, the incident
here complicated the regime’s efforts to have a firm sway on the unfolding situation.
This event and then the proceedings in the Supreme Court afterwards dominated the print,
electronic and social media. On all the mediums, different personalities represented the movement.
While the lawyers had several nationally recognized legal heavyweights representing them, it was
Aitazaz Ahsan who became its public face. The credentialed lawyer was also a veteran leader of
PPP. Aitazaz was chosen as the CJ’s Defense Council when the latter’s case was sent to the
Supreme Judicial Council. Aitazaz’s popularity lay not only in his legal and intellectual sharpness,
but also fiery speeches. It was him who proved the most effective leader in framing the struggle
for the CJ, and through his restoration the independence of judiciary too. Aitazaz, through
numerous public platforms, highlighted the restrictions that the CJ was facing, and the
accompanying crackdown facing the movement (Montero 2007). Musharraf, for the first time, was
facing enormous criticism and pressure ever since he took the reign of power.
Non-democratic regimes are intolerant to most kind of political expressions, hence challenges to
Musharraf’s rule was a hitherto unprecedented development. Along with condemning Musharraf,
the nonviolent agitation was far louder and more widespread for the restoration of the CJ. The
reinstatement of the apex court judge also implied—at least metaphorically if not literally—the
independence of judiciary. This effective framing of the movement resonated with the public that
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now had a hope from a proactive judiciary to also mitigate their plight rooted in virtually
dysfunctional legal system. Additionally, with the historically unenviable history that judiciary had
in the country, as it validated the military coups and legitimized the unconstitutional removals of
the democratic governments, the Lawyers Movement’s success would also mean restoring the
judiciary’s image: A key pillar of the state working autonomously and without any subservience
to any other powerful institution. The framing was such that an independent judiciary would also
play an effective role in democratizing the society, and preventing any other authoritarian
interventions.
The Movement and the Regime’s Response:
Key to this particular mobilization was the fact that the movement had over 150 local bar councils
whose members numbered around 100,000 (Ahmed and Stephan 2010, 502). The agenda
responsiveness among the public was palpably strong. As pointed above, it was Ahsan that was the
public face of the movement after CJ himself. Ahsan’s presence in the movement, owing to his
stature and credibility, meant that it would generate support among the political parties too. It was
a moment for an arguably demobilized ARD too to engage in the struggle. However, in the initial
phase of the movement, it was the lawyers themselves who relied on their strength and tactics.
Along with the demonstrations, lawyers also started organizing Thursday strikes at district and
high courts, creating more pressure on the regime. The mode of protests lawyers used, particularly
the weekly strikes, led to public facing delays to their cases (Movement 2007). These delays meant
growing backlog of cases in the lower and upper courts which would trigger public’s anger. The
grievance would have dual effects; people’s fury both at lawyers and the regime. But the repertoire
mostly served the lawyers, leading to more pressure on Musharraf.
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As the CJ’s trial proceeded, movement leaders also undertook visits to various bar councils across
the country. The visits were not only aimed at informing the local chapters of lawyers about the
ongoing trial, but also to garner their support (Ahmed and Stephan 2010). These essentially
symbolic and nonviolent visits were also telecast live on television media that increased the
movement’s appeal. However, regime was now deploying repressive tactics to ease the growing
pressure it was put under by the collective action.
Sensing that the TV channels were growing critical of the regime’s action against CJ, Musharraf
decided to implement restrictions. TV channels, though, were now facing harassment (HRW
2007). The regime also arrested the lawyers and the political leaders that had announced support
for the movement (Walsh 2007). Amid the crackdown, the movement’s plan to hold a rally in the
country’s largest city, Karachi, was a major decision. However, the May 12th rally faced hurdles,
not so less by the city’s dominant political party and Musharraf’s coalition ally, Muttahida Qaumi
Movement (MQM) that decided to hold a countervailing demonstration (Imtiaz 2011). The rally
turned violent, and (MQM was accused of orchestrating attacks on lawyers and civil society alike
on May 12th that resulted in the killing of over 40 people (DAWN 2016). MQM was founded in
1984 by Altaf Hussain, a Karachi-based Urdu speaking activist and politician—naming the party
Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (Jaffrelot 2015). Over the decades, it remained close to, and faced a
crackdown by, different governments. However, when the elections were held in 2002, and MQM
won 19 seats in the National Assembly, it soon became an ally of General Musharraf. MQM held
a stranglehold on Karachi, and was opposed to the lawyers’ planned rally in the city. Consequently,
MQM was blamed for the deadly violence that was one of the worst since the movement had begun.
The bloodbath resulted in anger and outrage across the country, also causing a rift within the
coalition government.
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This was a sign of conflict and crack in the alliance. It was the May 12 incident that catapulted
civil society groups and opposition to the forefront of struggle that buttressed the movement. Sahar
Shafqat has extensively covered the subject of civil society’s participation in the movement,
viewing its role as catalyzing (S. Shafqat 2018). She attributes civil society’s rise in Pakistan to
economic liberalization in 2000s; and even though a beneficiary of Musharraf’s economic policies,
it turned against him because of his overt authoritarianism, and the appeal of the Lawyers
Movement. The scale and spread of the movement in the cities indicated the growing participation
of urban constituencies, running the gamut of students and professionals alike including the
doctors, students and human rights activists (S. Shafqat 2018, 901), building on the newfound
solidarity.
The participation of the latter two would go on to exert more pressure on the regime with daily
marches across the country. The repertoire this movement chose became its strong feature,
attracting more media attention. Talk shows not only invited legal experts and political analysts on
the unfolding situation but also covered the happenings of court in detail. Media’s role in framing
the issue, one which essentially asked if Musharraf had the authority to suspend the CJ
(Ghias 2010), resonated widely. The charged atmosphere was distinct from any phase since
Musharraf took power. So while his tactical and micromanaged freedoms to the media represented
the strength of consolidated regime, how the movement seized the opportunity was remarkable feat
in itself. The independence of judiciary as institution was a frame that had a political and emotional
resonance to it largely because of the history.
It then mattered how the regime chose court itself to fight and implicate Chaudhry. Consolidated
and powerful as it was, Musharraf regime could resort to not responding to the initial agitation of
the movement. However, its decision to take the case to the court was both a legally meaningful
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move, and also a potentially political move to ease the pressure. Nonetheless, what transpired was
different. Two months into the proceedings in the court, Supreme Judicial Council restored
Chaudhry as Supreme Court judge (S. Shafqat 2018). The reinstatement came as a surprise for two
reasons: There were apprehensions that the regime would interfere with the court’s ruling, and that
courts might not be as independent as it had lately been trying to demonstrate. However, at the end,
the movement essentially scored its first victory. With CJ restored, could it mean an end to the
movement as it had succeeded in attaining its main objective? Not so. The cycle of contention was
to continue. An invigorated judiciary, enjoying a relatively sizable support of the society, was to
build upon on its gain. This would manifest itself in the potential confrontation between the CJled
court and Musharraf.
State of Emergency, new elections and the continuation of Lawyers Movement:
Musharraf also decided to campaign for re-election despite the prevailing turmoil. He had already
been in secret talks with the opposition to extend his rule. His talks were with PPP, under the
international guarantees. However, PPP’s rationale for the backchannel discussions was to force
Musharraf’s exit once the party won the elections (Jaffrelot, 2015). The meetings were underway
since 2005 (Cameron-Moore 2007), long before the Lawyers Movement came to the forefront.
Musharraf, through another international deal, had previously let Nawaz Sharif leave the country
in exchange for his staying from politics for 10 years (Jalal 2014). As discussed earlier, Nawaz
negotiating the deal and leaving the country weakened the opposition alliance in the incipient stage.
On the other hand, Musharraf’s talks with the PPP was on National Reconciliation Order—that he
viewed as another means to maintain his hold on the power. As the details of NRO gradually
became public, resentment against it increased.
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The deal was finally had, and the unpopular NRO was signed in October 2007 (S. Shafqat 2018).
It constituted an amnesty scheme for a range of individuals—politicians, activists and bureaucrats
alike—who were accused of different felonies from January 1, 1986 to October 12 (Shah 2019).
The amnesty was not limited to one party alone; its beneficiaries would include members of every
political party. That also meant that exiled leaders like Nawaz and Benazir could return to Pakistan
now. As I have argued, regimes in their consolidated phase loosen restrictions because they feel
confident to avert any untoward challenge. Musharraf agreeing to NRO was more for restoring his
legitimacy. New elections would then supposedly give him credibility in the eyes of both public at
home, and observers and actors internationally. He could present the NRO as an effort to reconcile
with his adversaries and allow ‘democracy’ to flourish at home.
It is here that the movement’s success—in the form having forced the regime to reinstate the CJ—
would come to bear on political developments. General Musharraf’s effort to curtail the courts,
from any destabilizing interference as he negotiated with the opposition as well as to seek
reelection as a President, backfired since the movement viewed not only a threat in this latest move
but also an opportunity. As CJ was reinstated, the legality of Musharraf’s reelection was challenged
in SC by different petitioners, involving lawyers, opposition parties, and civil society groups (S.
Shafqat 2018) Musharraf viewed these petitions in the court as a direct challenge to his political
survival. As the Court agreed to hear the petitions and the proceedings began, media once again
started giving the matter extensive coverage.
If the first round of agitation against Musharraf was defiant and transgressive to Musharraf, the
latest challenge was existential for him. On November 03, 2007, President Musharraf suspended
the constitution and imposed state of emergency (DAWN 2013). The Chief Justice was again
deposed. Musharraf used the pretext of restoring order for taking yet another extralegal measure
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(Ahmed and Stephan, Fighting for the rule of law: civil resistance and the lawyers' movement in
Pakistan 2010, 497). Along with the judiciary, regime targeted the media too this time given the
latter’s recent role in highlighting the movement’s struggle. On the same day, all private channels
went off and only the state controlled PTV was allowed to release the proclamation of emergency
(DAWN 2013).
With the new emergency in place, judges were required to retake oaths under PCO (S. Shafqat
2018). Having just confronted the regime with its assertive autonomy, the judiciary reacted
differently, marking a change that evinced itself through the predominant majority of judges’
refusal to accept PCO (HRW 2007). It was a departure from the judiciary’s history, one in which
martial laws or emergencies were mostly given legal protections by the courts. As many as 97
judges were dismissed and placed in detention and house arrest; thousands of lawyers were also
arrested in the crackdown (Ahmed and Stephan, Fighting for the rule of law: civil resistance and
the lawyers' movement in Pakistan 2010, 497). However, for the lawyers it was a temporary
setback. In fact, the intense regime clampdown triggered a new wave of protests with the renewed
aim: Adliya Bachao Tehreek, or Save the Judiciary Movement.
If the previous phase of movement demanded the reinstatement of a judge, the new focus was on
restoring judiciary’s independence. With media and social media playing an expanded role, new
allies joined the movement. Students also started making their presence felt. In the previous
chapters, I have talked about the student union ban. Amid unavailability of a platform and
organization, the students joining the movement was a major development. What added force to it
was the history of students’ uprising against General Ayub—a movement covered in this
dissertation. So there converged multiple symbols and histories that strengthened the Lawyers
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Movement. In the absence of organized Student Unions, group of protesting students opted for
rallies, writing blogs (Mullick 2008, 08) to draw attention to the protests. Arguably, students’
participation demonstrated the popularity of the movement. The more allies it would gather, the
more pressure the movement was able to build.
Lawyers Movement had now entered a decisive phase as the protests swelled, and the crackdown
on both the lawyers and their allies was intensified. Not only was President Musharraf was facing
a domestic backlash—more urgent and stronger than the first round of movement, he was also
under enormous international pressure including from the US administration. Because he was
simultaneously holding offices of Army Chief of Staff as well as the President, Musharraf and his
allies considered his stepping down as Army Chief a tactically smart move to minimize the
expanding political pressure. While he extended his Presidency for five years, Musharraf decided
to step down as the Army Chief (Review 2010). Along with these developments, election
campaigns also picked momentum across the country. PPP and PMLN, the political parties who
were marginalized and repressed, were now more active as the elections approached. However, a
tragedy struck that has continued to impact Pakistan’s politics since.
Political Assassination and Its Impact:
It was the fateful day of December 27, 2007 when the country’s twice-elected Premier, Benazir
Bhutto was assassinated during an election rally, not only dealing an irrecoverable blow to PPP
itself (Mufti, Shafqat and Siddiqui 2020) but throwing the country into crisis. She had previously
survived an attempt on her life when her October 18th rally was attacked by the suicide bombers in
Karachi. The Taliban claimed responsibility for the killing (Zafar 2018). Although the regime had
signed NRO with the exiled opposition—chiefly Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif who were now
allowed to return to the country, differences had developed between the Musharraf and Bhutto’s
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PPP (Mufti, Shafqat and Siddiqui 2020, 223). Musharraf was said to be against Bhutto’s return to
the country, while the PPP was also opposed to the recently imposed state of emergency. Amid
outrage and bloody violence on the streets against the assassination, lawyers demanded that
political parties boycott the elections. However, PPP decided to participate in the elections based
on its experience of the 1980s. As shown in the previous chapter about the MRD, PPP had opposed
and boycotted the non-party elections under General Zia. But despite its opposition and MRD’s
resistance, the elections were held which not only brought anti-PPP forces into power, it also led
to some of its members switching sides. The regime back then seized the moment to break the
ideological hold of PPP, and any other political force that could be threatening to its survival.
New Elections, New Civilian Government and the Movement:
PPP’s refusal in 2008 to boycott the elections influenced the other major party, PMLN that
followed suit. With election set of February 18, 2008 under the presidency of Pervez Musharraf,
PMLN vowed to restore judges if the party came to power (Ahmed and Stephan, 2010). PPP had
a different view about the restoration of judges. As the results of election came, it was PPP that
had won the majority. But it formed the government with PML-N as its major ally along with other
small parties in order to deepen political reconciliation. There were now hopes that the constitution
would be restored in its original form—undoing the changes that a military dictator had made.
Also, the formation of government having a powerful civilian coalition was seen as a hopeful sign
for the restoration of judges as well as well as the impeachment of President Musharraf. The ruling
PPP did not necessarily agree with their coalition partners. For the former, forcing Musharraf’s
resignation was more important for a complete transition to, and strengthening of, democracy. PPP
did not consider the reinstatement of judges as important. Its ministers argued that PPP was not
opposed to the restoration of judges, but they differed on the method (Haider, Reuters 2008).
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Musharraf’s resignation, in PPP’s view, would help the government focus on the more immediate
issues, ranging from the economic challenges to the growing lawlessness and accompanying
political instability. PMLN, on the other hand, did not see any political benefit in staying with the
PPP considering the overall state of country’s politics. Being a coalition partner for PMLN, as it
leaders thought, would mean inviting more questions over the failure to deliver, including on its
promise to restore the judges. The back and forth led to PMLN quitting the coalition few months
after just forming the alliance (Haider, Reuters 2008).

PMLN quitting the government coalition brought about a new wave of uncertainty. On the other
hand, the Lawyers Movement maintained its momentum, putting more pressure on the PPP-led
government. Barely a few weeks after PMLN abandoning the government, the lawyers decided to
organize another march for the restoration of judges, and removal of Pervez Musharraf (S. Shafqat
2018). Since long marches had a particular resonance to the movement, what was significant about
this was its being held during a different political setup. In terms of the numbers alone, it was a
huge collection of participants—consisting lawyers and their political and civil society allies.
However, as tens of thousands of them poured into the capital city, with the movement leadership
considering holding a sit-in protest until their demands were met, the rally was suddenly called off
(S. Shafqat 2018, 896). The rally’s abrupt dispersal caused anger and disappointment. Some even
saw it as a setback for the movement because there appeared a real possibility of a somewhat
accommodating, and fragile, democratic government to accept the movement’s demand. That
eventuality did not happen. Nonetheless, PPP showed agreement, in principle, to restore the judges;
but no exact date was announced. As for Musharraf’s fate, there seemed to be an agreement that
he should go. The pressure on Musharraf to resign, from the public and the new government under
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PPP, started showing results. The ruling government in August 2008 made its move for
Musharraf’s impeachment, spurred by the intensification of pressure against the President. By now,
Musharraf had realized that he no longer had his former institution’s support; nor the political
forces that he had propped up showed any sign of backing him. Reading the writing on the wall,
he resigned on August 17. While the movement took the credit for expediting the dictator’s
resignation, PPP maintained it was its strategic thinking and move that prompted Musharraf’s
departure. That said, lawyers could now have an undivided focus on the reinstatement of judges.
PPP-government, however, did not seem willing to restore the judges (S. Shafqat 2018). On the
second anniversary of the movement, in March 2009, the movement decided to muster another
significant protest in— a new long march to—capital (Gall 2009). The movement found a strong
backing in PMLN’s open support to the lawyers’ plan. With media freedoms mostly restored, the
TV channels also amplified the voices unencumbered by any fear or intimidation.
Ironically, sensing a threat from the movement, the democratic government launched a crackdown.
The newly elected government did not still want to use the kind of suppressive and disempowering
tactics that the Musharraf regime employed. Any such attempt to crush the protest would endanger
an uncontainable backlash for the ruling coalition. The movement, by now expanding more and
gathering more allies including one of the largest political parties of the country, moved ahead with
its long march (Ahmed and Stephan 2010). As protests began around the country, live TV footages
gave a glimpse into the passion driving this new round of contention. The political climate was
such that the PPP government could no longer afford delaying the restoration of the judges. PPP
had come to power after 12 years, that too after losing its leader, and forming a government through
a shaky coalition. The choices were limited for the PPP, and the demand for restoration of judges
too powerful and widespread to ignore. The participants of long march’s arrival in the capital could
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cause massive uncertainty considering the previous plan of the movement to hold a sit-in until the
acceptance of its demand. It is under these circumstances that the ruling coalition finally announced
to restore the judges (S. Shafqat 2018).
The announcement was made in the parliament by the then Prime Minister, Yusuf Raza Gillani: ‘I
order all the provincial governments to release political workers, lawyers and all those arrested
during the long march ... I want to congratulate the nation. Let us celebrate this with dignity.’
(Ahmed and Stephan 2010, 502) The sustained, nonviolent movement had now won a decisive
victory—attaining its key goals thanks not only to its undeterred mobilization. While the repressive
tactics meted out to it were overwhelming, the movement built on its What is unique about the
whole movement is that in its initial pursuit to restore the deposed chief justice, it went on to create
pressure on the military regime to go back to barracks and restore democracy. 11 years since the
movement, Pakistani democracy has had one of its first back to back peaceful transitions since
1947.
Conclusion:
This chapter explored the Lawyers Movement, its origin and evolution. The discussion began by
shedding light the 1999 military coup by Pervez Musharraf, and the consolidation of his regime.
The chapter showed how the regime was able to not only jail and exile the main opposition leaders,
but also split the country’s main political parties in order to prevent any challenge to its authority.
The regime used a subtle combination of coercion and cajoling to first not only help form the
PMLQ , and then used the anti-corruption campaign to disqualify or win the loyalty of other party
activists. The dual approach led to the consolidation of the regime. It was able to render ARD
irrelevant in no time; hence the movement could not mount an effective challenge. The chapter
showed that in the absence of a strong opposition from political parties in the initial years, it was
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judicial activism under the Lawyers Movement that changed the political landscape. CJ’s populist
suo motu actions became a challenge to President Musharraf who sought Chaudhry’s resignation.
As it demonstrated, CJ’s refusal to resign despite intense pressure provided an impetus to the bars
across country who took to the streets for CJ’s restoration once he was deposed. These actions
illustrated an unprecedented assertion of the Court trying to autonomously act against a military
dictator. Just when the regime thought it was emboldened, and could avert any kind of crisis, there
were newer opportunities for the movement to progress. The independence of media and a
burgeoning civil society created new openings. Once CJ was restored, an independent judiciary
was a challenge to the reelection of Musharraf as the President. It was shown how Musharraf
imposed emergency and brought a new PCO that was rejected outright by majority of the judges,
who were then dismissed by the dictator. In the second wave of protests within few months, judges
who were following the path of CJ effectively challenged General Musharraf’s rule. This translated
into a renewed energy in the movement.
This nonviolent resistance now, as the chapter demonstrated, not only about restoration of judges,
but also for the resignation of President Musharraf. Lawyers Movement eventually succeeded in
achieving and facilitating both, ushering in an arguably autonomous judiciary as well as helping in
the democratic struggle. How this judicial independence strengthens democracy remains to be
seen. The question is more relevant considering the influence that the lawyers exercise now. With
its success, it is critical to highlight that the movement itself has been subject to criticism too. Some
analysts did not see it as wholly representative of Pakistani society’s struggle. They rather
considered it a mobilization with distinctly urban orientation meant for the middle classes and their
aspirations (Siddiqa 2012) (Mufti, Shafqat and Siddiqui 2020). Others critique the movement for
enabling judicialization of politics that has led to interfering in the function of democratic
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government (Ghias 2010). Almost over a decade into the movement, Chaudhry and his successors
have demonstrated both restraint and activism in their tenures. Two examples are noteworthy here.
Democratically elected Prime Minister, Yusuf Raza Gilani was ousted by the court in 2012. He
was convicted by the same CJ of contempt of court due to his refusal to write a letter to Swiss
authorities for reopening corruption cases against President Asif Ali Zardari, who happened to be
his party leader too (Mufti, Shafqat and Siddiqui 2020, 247). In 2017, Premier Nawaz Sharif was
ousted from power under Article 62, based on misdeclaration of assets and allegations of corruption
(IBID).
The past two decades represent a wholly different chapter for the generations of Pakistanis who
not only witnessed previous martial laws and accompanying democratic struggle, but the dictatorial
rule of Pervez Musharraf. The years since 2000 have also continually shaped the sociopolitical and
socioeconomic trajectories. The War on Terror that unleashed unabated violence in major parts of
the country, State of Emergency, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s assassination, economic
downturn and countrywide and electricity breakdowns are some of the major issues that the society
has to tide over. Now that there has been a democratic transition, the questions on the democratic
institutionalization and civilian supremacy still linger. The civil military tensions that constitute a
regular feature since the restoration of democracy in 2008 are neither unique nor historically appear
to have any immediate solution. Amid a host of unresolved issues that are both economic and
political in nature, the deliverance on governance is a profound challenge that the civilian
dispensations face. The discussion on how centralization created a sense of alienation and how the
authoritarian leaders rather view it as a source of cohesion is another issue that the democratic
leaders face. Political and legal debates on it in the past few years, especially in the context of 18th
Amendment that decentralizes power (Mufti, Shafqat and Siddiqui 2020), illustrate the
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complexities that all institutions have to navigate. The said amendment also redefined the
relationship between the parliament and judiciary along with restoration of the country’s
parliamentary character (Rana 2020). With more rights and liberties guaranteed now, and the
democratic transition completed, how institutions act, and decentralization work will be important
questions to ponder over.
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Findings and Future Research:
In this work, I sought to explore the role of social movements against authoritarian regimes in
Pakistan. Delving into the decades-long struggles in different periods of the country’s history, I
examined the successes and failures of the social movements in Pakistan against the nondemocratic
dispensations. My main argument was that the movements turn into popular mobilizations with
bigger success when they occur in the consolidated phase of authoritarian regimes, thus providing
more opportunities for social movements to succeed. I discussed how the authoritarian regimes
consolidate once they seize power. I contended that the initial phase of authoritarian seizure often
entails the regime’s repressive crackdown on any resistance, particularly the democracy-restoring
movements, thereby helping the nondemocratic dispensation to cement control. However, once the
regime has consolidated, it gradually substitutes suppression with some, albeit a minimal, level of
incentives to woo new supporters, and increase its legitimacy. By its sheer orientation, authoritarian
regimes come to power illegally, and one might argue that they do not require legitimacy to
perpetuate their rule. However, seeking legitimacy has an expediency attached to it. Regimes do it
out of self-interest to expand their support base through economically and politically patronizing
different groups and classes (Gerschewski 2013). This also provides them a buffer to lessen
opposition and neutralize challengers. However, the limited openness that consolidated regimes
allow, also, creates opportunities for the hitherto dormant or a new movement to mobilize. It is in
this regime-consolidated phase when the movement builds not only on the disenfranchised and
beleaguered population’s sentiments but also on its own strength and renewed mobilization to bring
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about the change it seeks. This argument, empirically withstanding its ground, is an addition to the
literature on authoritarianism.
In highlighting the three movements, all essentially aimed at restoring democratic institutions, the
dissertation advanced an explanation for the respective outcomes of the movements. It illustrated
that through detailing the students uprising against General Ayub, MRD against General Zia, and
the Lawyers Movement against General Musharraf. I considered failure as the movement’s lack of
success in realizing the goals it enunciated at the onset of mobilization due to regime’s stifling and
suppressing tactics. The internal divisions resultantly, or lack of cohesion organizationally, also
illustrates the movement’s failure. MRD’s inability to force Zia accept the lifting of martial law,
restore constitution and hold elections illustrated its failure as it came under pressure and
repression. The movement failed to cohere into a strong enough political entity to avoid
demobilization. However, the fact that MRD’s presence remained, even if not extensively as a
mobilized political entity, cannot take away its struggle during extreme repression and challenges
that has created its own memory and precedent.
MRD’s demobilization should also be contextualized in how General Zia’s dictatorial ended. As
noted in the discussion concerning 1977-1988 authoritarian rule, MRD was sidelined after 1984—
a year after its second attempt to remobilize. General Zia died in the air-crash in 1988 which also
ushered in new elections, leading to democracy. The question that can be posed here, which also
has an implication on the argument regarding consolidation, is: would there be a new mobilization
if the movement perceived any opening in the system? Would the dictator take any decision that
could prove to be an impetus for the movement to agitate? If the answer to those questions is yes,
we might probably have seen renewed protestations sweeping the streets the way they did during
General Ayub’s yesteryears.
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That consolidating regimes force demobilization could also be seen in the instances involving
struggles against General Ayub’s martial law. The initial protestations were either swiftly crushed,
or coopted. Public grievances existed, but they could not either be channeled or was eventually
effectively regulated and or/curbed because of the authoritarian crackdown. A self-assured
President Ayub, consolidated as his regime was, decided to seek reelection in 1965, allowing
controlled electoral contestation. Ayub regime’s calculation was that it would be able to manage
the fallout of limited oppositional participation, but the disparate ideological and political forces
found an opportunity in the elections, challenging him through the strongest possible candidate
available, Fatima Jinnah. Although Ayub won the election, evidently unfairly that deepened the
grievances against regime not only because of manipulated election but also centralization of the
power. No less significant was the impact of war against India that added more pressure on the
regime. These factors fueled opposition, and kept piling on until the Student Movement channeled
it through directly demanding his resignation. The movement managed to win powerful allies in
political parties, saw the elite division, and formed alignments to achieve the successful outcome.
Likewise, General Musharraf overseeing the formation of a political party that broke away from
one of the country’s main political entities—PMLN, and then his introducing accountability
mechanisms to both woo and intimidate the opposition leaders tallied with the original thesis
offered. His ability to also render Alliance for Restoration of Democracy (ARD) irrelevant through
coopting and giving incentives to his main leaders to divide the opposition, tallied the argument
pertaining to consolidating regime’s measures. After having consolidated, the military regime’s
allowing new TV channels and then going against the SC judge exhibited its confidence. However,
it was in that very phase that the movement for the restoration of judge and the judiciary transpired
once CJ was forcibly removed, prompting the lawyers to mobilize for his restoration. The
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movement here originated not only because of the opportunity available to it, but the cost that not
acting had on the judiciary. Hence, the outcome of the movements was a significant reference point
to the original contention of this thesis.
This is an important contribution not only to social movements literature against the nondemocratic
rule, but also the literature on movements in South Asia. As such, it is hoped, this work will guide
the research on the movements against the non-democratic regimes. The limitations of the research
here, though, can be bridged in the future scholarship on the subject. A comparative study that
assesses the social movements in other South Asian countries will offer some invaluable insights.
For example, how Bangladesh has fared since 1971, from its civilian democracy to military
dictatorships and the democratic transition, will have empirically meaningful answers to the
question relating to the movements and democracy. Equally importantly, such a comparative work
will also help evaluate the similarity or contrast in the autocratic dispensations’ orientations and
their responses when they are challenged during their consolidation. The scholarship offered here
provides a building block for such comparability. To add, while South Asia mostly has democratic
setups in place, personalized and authoritarian tendencies have increased significantly lately.
Rights movements have increased over the past few years. Hence, will the democratic governments
respond to them with enacting reforms or act more repressively is a question to explore.
The work also advances the understudied social movement literature in Pakistan. Importantly, I
have attempted to supplement the analysis of, and the distinction between, Pakistan’s political
development and the social movements. My argument is that the movements offer a broader
understanding of the country’s institutional evolution and institutional interlinkages. Of note are
the ways judiciary played its role over the decades. The institutional evolution can be seen in how
in its reflections and judgments on the critical historical events that swept Pakistan’s politics right
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from the dissolution of Constituent Assembly, and then the imposition of martial law. If some
judges in the past gave a legal cover to the military dictators when they dislodged the civilian
leaders through coups, the November 2007 Emergency, and the concomitant refusal of judges to
take oath under PCO demonstrated a historic change. This defiance was unprecedented in that the
Court and the Bar came to represent a transformative political shift as they jointly resisted a
dictator. Also, the discussion has relevance on the movements in the Pakistan’s democratic setting.
At a time when the rights movements have emerged in the country, it can be instructive to compare
their evolution with the ones highlighted here. Such a comparative study will inform the literature
on the democracy and popular movements in Pakistan. Pakistani citizens’ struggle and their being
committed to participatory political processes are a testament to their democratic aspirations.
Hence, in how collective actions will evolve during the country’s democratic consolidation offers
new avenues for analytical and empirical inquiry.
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